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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
PAUL C. ALLEN, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
v. 
CLINT FRIEL, STATE OF UTAH, et al., 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Case No. 20070254-SC 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Petitioner appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging 
his conviction for aggravated murder, a capital offense. This Court has jurisdiction of this 
appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, PRESERVATION, 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the Court should summarily dismiss petitioner's appeal, where he fails 
to either acknowledge or challenge the post-conviction court's dismissal of the petition? 
Standard of Review: "It is well established that a reviewing court will not address 
arguments that are not adequately briefed." State v. Thomas,96\ P.2d 299,304 (Utah 1998). 
2. Whether the post-conviction court correctly concluded that all but one of 
petitioner's claims were procedurally barred and that his remaining claim of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel was too vague and speculative to satisfy his burden of proof? 
Standard of Review: '"We review an appeal from an order dismissing or denying a 
petition for post-conviction relief for correctness without deference to the lower court's 
conclusions of law.'" Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT 42, \ 7, 94 P.3d 263 (quoting Rudolph 
v. Galetka, 2002 UT 7, f 4, 43 P.3d 467). 
STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes are attached at Addendum A: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2 (West 2004); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3 (West 2004); 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-35a-105 and -106 (West 2004); 
Utah R. App. P. 3, 11, 23B, and 24; 
Utah R. Evid. 606; 
UtahR. Crim. P. 17. 
CASE AND FACT STATEMENT 
The Criminal Case 
On the evening of August 28,1996, police discovered the lifeless body of petitioner's 
wife, Jill Allen, in their North Salt Lake City apartment. State v. Allen,20Q5\JT 11^3,108 
P.3d. 730 (Addendum B). Blood spattered the surrounding walls and soaked the carpet 
beneath her half-naked body. Id. at lfif3-4. A baseball bat lay nearby. Id. atf 3. Although 
there were signs that there had been a struggle, there was no evidence of a forced entry. Id. 
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at <|f 4. A forensic pathologist determined that death was caused by strangulation and blunt 
force trauma to the head and that there was no evidence of sexual assault. Id. 
Months after the police had unsuccessfully pursued leads, Brandon Nicholsen came 
forward. Id. at f 5. He informed the lead investigator that he had assisted a coworker, 
George Anthony Taylor, to dispose of evidence of the murder of a woman in North Salt 
Lake. Id. In exchange for immunity, Nicholsen told police that three weeks before the 
murder, Taylor told him that Taylor and a Joseph Wright had been hired by a "Paul" to kill 
Paul's wife, for which Taylor would receive between $5,000 and $10,000 for his 
participation. Id. 
Later, Taylor admitted the killing to Nicholsen, explaining that when the gun he intended to 
use misfired, he beat Jill with a bat and then strangled her to death. Id. 
Taylor and Wright confessed to their parts in the murder. Id. at f^ij 7-8. Wright told 
police that petitioner approached him in 1995 and indicated that he, petitioner, knew a 
coworker who would pay to have "a guy" killed. Id. at «f 8. Later, after Wright had shown 
some interest, petitioner said it was he who wanted his wife killed. Id. Petitioner offered 
to pay Wright $30,000 from Jill's life insurance policy to kill her. Id. In April 1996, after 
discussing various plans, Wright agreed to the offer. Id. 
According to Wright, petitioner paid him between $14,000 and $16,000 before and 
after the murder, promising the balance when petitioner received the proceeds of the 
insurance policy. Id. at f 9. 
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Following the police investigation, the State charged petitioner with aggravated 
murder, conspiracy to commit aggravated murder, and criminal solicitation in connection 
with the murder. Id. at^JlO. 
At trial, petitioner was represented by Ronald Yengich and Bradley Rich. R256. 
Following a three-week trial in February 2000, a jury convicted petitioner of aggravated 
murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life with the possibility of parole. Allen, 2005 
UTll,1f 10;R12. 
After trial, trial counsel and petitioner had a conference in which counsel and 
petitioner purportedly discussed possible claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
petitioner might raise. R559, \ 7. That conference was transcribed and the transcript was 
sealed. Id. 
Petitioner moved for a new trial alleging that a juror had learned from her husband 
that defense counsel had requested a mistrial and that the juror had later relayed that 
information to the jury. Allen, 2005 UT 11, ^ 47. The trial court denied the motion, 
concluding that although the juror's conduct was inappropriate, defendant had not been 
prejudiced, because the juror's impropriety was "innocuous" and because the jury did not 
discuss the mistrial issue. Id. at ^ 48. 
On direct appeal, petitioner was represented by Scott Wiggins. Id. Petitioner claimed 
that the trial court abused its discretion in (1) permitting the prosecution to introduce 
evidence under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, that petitioner had made fraudulent 
credit card purchases; (2) refusing to grant a mistrial after Wright testified that pel itioner had 
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been asked by the police to take a lie detector test; and (3) refusing to grant a new trial based 
on juror misconduct. Id. at \ 11. This Court rejected all of those claims on the merits and 
affirmed petitioner's conviction. Id. at Xi U 12-57. The Court also refused to consider, 
based on inadequate briefing, petitioner's claims that (1) the trial ututl erred in denying a 
motion for a mistrial based on a witness's brief mention that petitioner had retained an 
attorney; (2) the reasonable doubt instruction was incorrect; and (3) petitioner was prejudiced 
by cumulative error. Id. n.2. Petitioner did not claim that the evidence was insufficient to 
support his conviction for aggravated in 
The United States Supreme Court denied petitioner's petition for writ of certiorari on 
October 3,2005, see Allen v. Utah, 126 S. Ct. 60 (2005), and denied rehearing on December 
12, 2005. See Allen v. Utah, 126 S. Ct. 823 (2005). 
The 1 Petition for Post-conviction Relie I 
Petitioner, pro se, timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief on October 18, 
2005, R29-196. The petition alleged five broad claims for relief. R43-83. On review of the 
petition, the post-conviction court noted that the petition contained several additional distinct 
claims. See Order Requiring Responsive Pleading from the <*:\\e of Utah ("Order for 
Response"), R201-04, at 201 (Addendum C). Thus, "for the sake of clarity, the court. . . 
renumbered all of the claims raised in the petition as follows: [1]; Judicial Bias; [2] 
Prosecution's use of false testimony during trial; [3] Jurors were not fair and impartial; [4] 
Trial court's refusal to give Petitioner's proffered jury instructions; [5] Erroneous jury 
instructions and special verdict form; [6] Error in trying Petitioner for multiple offenses; [7] 
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The Utah Supreme Court's decision on Petitioner's direct appeal was result-driven and 
erroneous; [8] Error by the trial court resulting in a trial that was fundamentally unfair; [9] 
Error by the trial court in denying Petitioner's motion for a new trial; [10] Ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel; and [11] Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel." R201-02. 
The post-conviction court dismissed claims 7 and 9 and ordered the State to respond 
to all the other claims identified by the court. See Order for Response, R202-03. 
After the State was ordered to respond, Scott Daniels appeared for petitioner. R219. 
Thereafter, the parties agreed in open court that Mr. Daniels should be permitted to withdraw 
as counsel and instead act in an advisory capacity only and that defendant would represent 
himself. R385, 393, 394-95, 397-401, 418, 423-24. 
The State filed a motion to dismiss the petition. See Motion to Dismiss Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief and Supporting Memorandum ("Motion to Dismiss"), R238-61. 
Tracking the enumeration of claims applied to the petition by the court, the State first noted 
that the court had dismissed claim numbers 7 and 9. R245. The State then argued that all 
but one of petitioner's undismissed claims were procedurally barred. R246-49. As to the 
remaining claim—that appellate counsel was ineffective (claim 11)—the State argued that 
the claim was too vague to merit consideration and, to the extent the claim could be 
understood, it failed on its merits. R257-60. At the same time, the State also moved to strike 
the affidavit of juror Trenton David, which appeared to partly form the basis of claims 3 and 
8. R58, 78-81, 192-93,230-32. 
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Petitioner moved for judgment on the pleadings. R373-75. He also responded to the 
State's motion to dismiss, arguing that under federal law there is no procedural default where 
there is failure to raise a claim of ineffective assistance on direct appeal. R3 52-60. 
The State replied, arguing that not only was fedc - -aw irrelevant to the discussioi 1 
of state procedural bar, but that petitioner was mistaken even if federal policy did apply to 
Utah law. R. 441-47. The State also rebutted conceivable grounds of ineffective assistance 
of appellate counsel stemming from on petitioner's vague allegations. R447-62. 
Petitioner replied, expanding the arguments he had i nade in the petition and in his 
response to the motion to dismiss. R478-539. 
On January 24, 2007, the post-conviction court heard arguments on all pending 
motions and took the matter under advisement. R557. Petitioner appeared for himself, pro 
se, and Mr. Daniels sat at counsel table with petitioner, acting in an advisory capacity. /</ 
On March 14, 2007, the court dismissed the petition. Order Dismissing Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief ("Order of Dismissal"), R557-560 (Addendum D). The court ruled 
that all of petitioner's undismissed claims, with the exception of a claim of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel, were procedurally / iv558, j^ 3. As to the claim of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, it ruled that petitioner's claims were "too vague 
and speculative" to satisfy his burden of proof. R558-59, f 5. The court also denied 
petitioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings and granted the State's motion to strike the 
affidavit of juror Trenton David R560, Yl 2 & 3. 
Defendant timely appealed. R565. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The Court should summarily dismiss this appeal. Although Utah's appellate courts 
tend to accord pro se litigants some leniency, those litigants must still follow the appellate 
rules. Petitioner in this case has blatantly disregarded those rules. 
Petitioner purports to appeal the post-conviction court's dismissal of his petition. 
However, petitioner's brief is nothing more than his petition behind an appellate brief cover. 
Consequently, petitioner on appeal neither mentions the existence of the court's order of 
dismissal nor challenges any of the court's conclusions for dismissing the petition. The Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure expressly provide that an appellant may "appeal" a final order 
of the trial court. Presented simply as a post-conviction petition, however, petitioner's appeal 
essentially dictates that this Court examine his petition de novo, in contravention of this 
Court's statutorily authorized appellate function. Those rules also require that an appellant 
provide the "contentions and reasons" relevant to the issues on appeal. Here, petitioner has 
flouted the appellate rules by failing to even challenge the post-conviction court's order. 
Additionally, petitioner has not brought up the record in the criminal case, which is 
necessary to assess his claims of error. He has not brought up the transcript of the hearing 
in which the court heard argument on the petition. And he has not adequately briefed or 
supported with a pertinent record the only issue not ruled procedurally barred. That issue 
involves a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. After trial, trial counsel and petitioner 
had a conference in which counsel and petitioner purportedly discussed possible claims of 
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ineffective assistance of counsel that petitioner might raise in the future. Although that 
conference was transcribed, petitioner never moved to unseal it in the post-conviction 
proceedings and has not made it part of the record on appeal. Accordingly; this Court should 
summarily dismiss petitioner's appeal as inadequately briefed and affirm, without further 
review, the post-conviction court's order dismissing the petition. 
POINT II 
Should this Court excuse petitioner's deficiencies, the post-conviction court correctly 
dismissed, the petition. Soon after the petition was filed, the court determined that although 
petitioner had raised five numbered claims, the petition actually included additional 
unnumbered claims. The court renumbered petitioner's claims, listing and specifically 
identifying a total of eleven. The court ruled that two of the claims were frivolous, a 
conclusion that petitioner does not dispute. 
After reviewing the State's motion to dismiss the petition and all subsequently-filed 
pleadings of the parties, the court ruled that all but one of the remaining nine claims could 
have been raised at trial or on appeal, but were not. Accordingly, the court ruled that, under 
the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, those claims were procedural 1\ barred, Petitioner has 
made no persuasive argument to rebut that conclusion. 
Petitioner's sole remaining claim was that appellate counsel was ineffective for not 
raising trial counsels' ineffectiveness in stipulating, in petitioner's absence, that the testimony 
of two prosecution witnesses not be given to the jury. The court essentially ruled that any 
objection petitioner might have made to withholding the testimony would have been futile. 
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Contrary to petitioner's claim, a criminal defendant is not entitled to input when a trial court 
communicates with the jury on a point of law. And even if the trial court acted improperly, 
petitioner was not prejudiced because the testimony would almost certainly have been 
withheld based on the prosecutors' objection. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT SHOULD SUMMARILY DISMISS PETITIONER'S 
APPEAL, WHICH FAILS TO EITHER ACKNOWLEDGE OR 
CHALLENGE THE POST-CONVICTION COURT'S DISMISSAL OF 
THE PETITION 
"As a general rule, a party who represents himself will be held to the same standard 
of knowledge and practice as any qualified member of the bar [.]" Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 
P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983). "At the same time, . . . 'because of [their] lack of technical 
knowledge of law and procedure [, pro se appellants] should be accorded every consideration 
that may reasonably be indulged.'" Id. (quoting Heathman v. Hatch, 13 Utah 2d 266, 372 
P.2d 990,991 (1962)). Nevertheless, even though appellate courts are "generally... lenient 
with pro se litigants," those litigants must still follow the appellate rules. Lundahl v. Quinn, 
2003 UT 11,1(4, 67 P.3d 1000. 
"It is well established that a reviewing court will not address arguments that are not 
adequately briefed." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998). 
Here, because petitioner has singularly disregarded the appellate rules, his brief is 
inadequate. Most importantly, petitioner has failed not only to challenge the post-conviction 
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court's conclusions for dismissing his petition, but also to even acknowledge the existence 
of the order of dismissal. 
An appeal is a "[r]esort to a superior (/. e. appellate) court to review the decision of an 
inferior (i.e. trial) court " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 88 (5th ed. 1979). See also Utah 
R. App. P. 3(a)("An appeal may be taken from a district... court to the appellate court. . . 
from all final orders . . . ."); Utah R. App. P. 24 (a)(9) ("The argument shall contain the 
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented ") Further, "rtlhe 
addendum shall contain a copy of:... those parts of the record that are of central imporiu i 
to the determination of the appeal, such as . . . conclusions of law . . . ." Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(l 1)(C). In light of what constitutes an appeal and in the circumstances of this case, 
rule 24 requires that appellant's "contentions and reasons" be directed in the first instance 
to the post-conviction court's dismissal of his petition, not to the alleged actions of the trial 
court or of the judiciary generally. See Aplt. Br. 
Here, petitioner's brief is essentially a verbatim copy of his petition. Petitioner has 
not acknowledged the post-conviction court's order of dismissal (R5 5 7-60, at Addendum D), 
merely mentioning instead that the coi irt am io\ n iced its rulings in a telephone conference. 
Aplt. Br. at 3. Nowhere does petitioner refer to the order of dismissal or challenge any of the 
post-conviction court's conclusions. Aplt. Br. at 4-44. None of the addenda contain a copy 
of the order of dismissal. Aplt. Br. at Addenda A-I. By his omissions, petitioner has 
completely disregarded the very concept of an appeal and contravened the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. By filing such a brief, petitioner essentially directs this Court to abdicate its 
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function as an appellate court and to examine his claims de novo, as though it were a trial 
court.1 
This Court is not authorized to function as petitioner presumes to dictate. "The 
Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction . . . over. . . orders . . . of any court of record over 
which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction." UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-2-2(i) (West 2004) (emphasis added). Because petitioner was charged with and 
convicted of a capital felony, see Allen, 2005 UT 11, ^ f 10, the court of appeals does not have 
original appellate jurisdiction over this case. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (West 
2004) ("The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction . . . over. . . appeals from any court 
of record in criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a . . . capital felony.") Thus, 
while this Court has formal appellate jurisdiction, petitioner's brief dictates that this Court 
review his claims outside its statutorily-authorized appellate role. Because petitioner has 
1
 The only differences between the brief and the petition are a minor change in 
form of a single page, typographical alterations in the table of contents, inclusion of an 
omitted phrase, and minor rearrangements of the same material in two addenda. 
Specifically, the differences are: (1) the rendering in question form in the brief of topics 
identified in the petition {compare Aplt. Br. at 2 with R30); (2) inclusion of an expanded 
jurisdictional statement in the brief {compare Aplt. Br. at 1 with R40); (3) substitution of 
Roman numerals for ordinal numbers in the Table of Contents {compare Aplt. Br. at i-x 
with R (R30-39); (4) a line spacing change beginning at page 30 of the brief pages and 
again at page 42 {compare Aplt. Br. at 30-44 with R69-81); (5) the addition in the brief of 
an enumerated phrase apparently omitted from the petition—"(4) [t]here are substantial 
allegations of newly discovered evidence" {compare Aplt. Br. at 42 with R81); and (6) the 
rearrangement of pages and exhibits in two addenda to the brief and the petition {compare 
Aplt. Br. at Addendum F, including pp. 11-13 of "Corrections in Utah Holding Hostage 
of an Entire State"; and Addendum H, exhibiting copy of new trial motion and affidavits 
of petitioner and Gary Potter with Addendum F of petition, Rl 76-77, exhibiting copy of 
new trial motion and affidavits of petitioner and Gary Potter, and Addendum H at 188-90, 
including pp. 11-13 of "Corrections in Utah Holding Hostage of an Entire State"). 
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disregarded the appellate rules and this Court's proper authority, the Court should summarily 
dismiss the appeal as inadequately briefed. 
Petitioner's failure to challenge the post-conviction courI s order of dismissal also 
provides an additional legal basis for summarily dismissing this appeal: Failure to challenge 
a trial court's ruling on appeal establishes the court's ruling as the law of the case, precluding 
further judicial review of the matter. State v. Rodriguez, 841 P.2d 1228,1229 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992) (citing Tracy v. University of Utah Hosp., 619 P.2d 340, 341 ( I Jtaii 1980) ("Where 
. . . any other final ruling or oi der of the trial court goes unchallenged by appeal, such 
becomes the law of the case, and is not thereafter subject to later challenge.")). 
Petitioner has also disregarded the appellate rules in other significant ways. An 
appellant has a duty to ensure the assembling of the record, including transcripts, necessary 
to the resolution of claims on appeal See Utah I X \ pp I ) 1 l(c -) (requiring that appellant 
comply with subsections (d) and (e) to enable clerk to assemble the record); Utah R. App. 
P. 11(d)(2) (requiring clerk to include all papers in the civil case); Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2) 
(requiring appellant to include in the record all transcripts relevant to a challenged finding 
or conclusion). Petitioner's brief and his pleadings below rely on the criminal record, 
particularly with respect to claims 2, 4-6, and 8-11. Aplt. Br. at 22, 14-25, 39-41, 43-44; 
Petition, R50, 53-64, 78-80, 82-83.2 However, petitioner did not make the record in the 
2
 To aid the Court in reviewing this case, the State has identified the claims the 
post-conviction court enumerated with those pages of the petition (and, consequently, 
petitioner's brief on appeal) on which those claims are apparently addressed. The 
following list (formalized as separate document at Addendum E) sets out the page of the 
petition, with its record number in parenthesis, followed by the corresponding page of 
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criminal case part of the record in the post-conviction proceedings. Consequently, none of 
the references in petitioner's brief or documents in addenda that were part of the criminal 
record are properly before this Court. Moreover, without the record of the criminal 
proceedings this Court cannot properly place petitioner's post-conviction claims in context. 
Finally, petitioner has failed to adequately brief his claim of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel, the only claim that was neither previously dismissed nor procedurally 
barred and by which petitioner might have legitimately addressed his other claims. See Order 
to Respond, R201-03 at 202 (Addendum C); and Order of Dismissal, R557-60 at 558, f 5 
(Addendum D). As discussed more fully at Point IIC, below, not only is that claim vague 
and speculative, it does not even discuss the test or cite to any authority by which ineffective 
assistance is measured. SeeStatev. Thomas, 1999 UT 2,^11,974 P.2d 269 ('" [A] reviewing 
court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not 
simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and 
research.'") (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)). Moreover, as the 
appellant's brief: (1) Judicial Bias — 15-19 (R43-47, 50-53, 73-78); 4-8, 11-14, 34-39; 
(2) Prosecution's use of false testimony during trial — 20-22, 25-30 (R48-50, 53-58); 9-
11, 14-19; (3) Jurors were not fair and impartial — 30, 51-52 (R58, 79-80); 19, 40-41; (4) 
Trial court's refusal to give petitioner's proffered jury instructions — 31, 53 (R 59, 81); 
20, 42; (5) Erroneous jury instructions and special verdict form — 32-33, 36, 53 (R60-61, 
64, 81); 21-22, 25, 42; (6) Error in trying Petitioner for multiple offenses — 34-35, 37-41 
(R62-63, 65-69); 23-24, 26-30; (7) The Utah Supreme Court's decision on petitioner's 
direct appeal was result-driven and erroneous — 41-45 (R69-73); 30-34; (8) Error by the 
trial court resulting in a trial that was fundamentally unfair — 50-55 (R78-83); 39-44; (9) 
Error by the trial court in denying Petitioner's motion for a new trial — 50 (R78); 39; (10) 
Ineffective assistance of trial counsel — 54-55 (R82-83); 43-44; and (11) Ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel — 54-55 (R82-83); 43-44. 
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post-conviction court noted, petitioner did not even request a review of the sealed transcript 
of a conference petitioner had with his trial counsel, Ron Yengich, in which they purportedly 
discussed possible claims of Mr. Yengich's ineffective assistance. R559, f 7. Given the 
significance of petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance to the survival of his claims 
generally, petitioner's failure to include this transcript is yet another significant breach of the 
appellate rules. Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2). 
In sum, and even recognizing the leniency appellate courts generally accord to pro se 
litigants, petitioner's disregard of the conceptual basis of an appeal and the appellate rules 
is sufficiently egregious that the appeal should be summarily dismissed. In any event, the 
post-conviction court correctly dismissed the petition. 
POINT II 
THE POST-CONVICTION COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED 
THAT ALL BUT ONE OF PETITIONER'S CLAIMS WERE 
PROCEDURALLY BARRED AND THAT HIS REMAINING CLAIM 
OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE COUNSEL WAS 
TOO VAGUE AND SPECULATIVE TO SATISFY HIS BURDEN OF 
PROOF 
Petitioner has not challenged the post-conviction court's dismissal of his petition. 
Therefore, as discussed at Point I, his appeal should be summarily dismissed. In any case, 
the post-conviction court's ruling was correct. 
"'We review an appeal from an order dismissing or denying a petition for 
post-conviction relief for correctness without deference to the lower court's conclusions of 
law.'" Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT 42, «| 7,94 P.3d 263 (quotingRudolph v. Galetka, 2002 
15 
UT 7, f 4, 43 P.3d 467). "Further, 'we survey the record in the light most favorable to the 
findings and judgment; and we will not reverse if there is a reasonable basis therein to 
support the trial court's refusal to be convinced that the writ should be granted.'" Myers v. 
State, 2004 UT 31, f 9, 94 P.3d 211 (quoting Medina v. Cook, 779 P.2d 658, 658 (Utah 
1989) (quotation omitted)). 
A. Almost all of petitioner's claims are procedurally barred because 
they could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal, but were not. 
The record shows that petitioner failed to carry his burden in the post-conviction 
proceedings, and that the court's conclusions dismissing the petition were correct. 
Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA), the burden is on petitioner to show 
that he is entitled to relief by a preponderance of the evidence. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
3 5a-105 (West 2004).3 Section 78-35a-105 also imposes on a petitioner the same burden to 
disprove "any ground of preclusion"—a responsive claim of procedural bar—if that ground 
is pled by the respondent. 
This Court has repeatedly applied procedural bar under the PCRA: "Post-conviction 
relief is a collateral attack on a conviction or sentence; it is not a substitute for appellate 
review." State v. Taylor, 2007 UT 12, f 14, 156 P.3d 739 (citing Carter v. Galetka, 2001 
3
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-105 (West 2004) provides: 
The petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to 
relief. The respondent has the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion 
under Section 78-3 5a-106, but once a ground has been pled, the petitioner 
has the burden to disprove its existence by a preponderance of the evidence. 
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UT 96, f 6, 44 P.3d 626 {Carter III)), cert denied, 525 U.S. 833 (2007). "A defendant is 
not eligible for post-conviction relief on any ground that was raised on appeal or that could 
have been raised on appeal." Id. (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-106 (2002)).4 Accord 
Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT 42, ffif 8-13,19, 94 P.3d 263 (challenged jury instruction was 
not raised at trial, on direct appeal, or in prior post-conviction proceeding); Carter III, 2001 
UT 96, ffl[ 14-15 (multiple claims that could have been raised on direct appeal, but were not, 
were procedurally barred). "Thus, on an appeal from a post-conviction order, this [C]ourt 
will only address the merits of claims that could not have been raised prior to the 
4
 Section 78-35a-106 has not been amended since it was enacted in 1996. See UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-35a-106 (West 2004 & Supp. 2006). The section provides as follows: 
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground 
that: 
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion; 
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal; 
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal; 
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction 
relief or could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for 
post-conviction relief; or 
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on 
a basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on 
appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-106 (2004). 
17 
post-conviction proceeding below . . . ." Id. (citing Carter III, 2001 UT 96, f 17). 
Nevertheless, although "[a] petitioner is 'procedurally barred' from relief under the PCRA 
if an issue 'could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal,' [a ground for relief may 
be raised if] the petitioner can demonstrate that 'the failure to raise that ground was due to 
ineffective assistance of counsel.'" State v. Benvenuto, 2007 UT 53, ^ 16, P.3d 
(quoting subsections 78-35a-106(l)(c) and (2)).5 
As enumerated by the post-conviction court, the petition raised eleven claims under 
which petitioner sought relief. See Order for Response, R201 -03, at 201 -02 (Addendum C). 
Directly after the petition was filed, the court dismissed claims 7 and 9 as frivolous. 
Petitioner has not challenged that conclusion. Using the court's enumeration of claims, the 
State moved to dismiss almost all of petitioner's remaining claims because they were 
procedurally barred under section 78-35a-106(b) and (c); that is, the State argued that those 
claims should be dismissed because they were raised or could have been raised on direct 
appeal. R245-49. The post-conviction court reviewed the petition and the parties' motions 
and memoranda and found that of the eleven claims asserted in the petition, eight were 
procedurally barred under section 78-35a-106: 
5
 Alternatively, this Court may reach an issue under the "unusual circumstances" 
exception to the procedural bar rule: "Under the unusual circumstances test, we will 
address claims that are procedurally barred if the petitioner can show 'that there was an 
obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right.'" Taylor, 
2007 UT 12, If 15, (quoting Carter III, 2001 UT 96, ^  15). Petitioner has not requested 
that the Court examine his claims under the unusual circumstances exception. In any 
event, petitioner's claims do not suggest the applicability of that exception. Aplt. Br. at 4-
44. 
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Almost all of petitioner's claims are procedurally barred. In his petition, 
petitioner alleged prosecutorial misconduct [claim 2], juror misconduct [claim 
3], improper jury instruction [claims 4 and 5], merger [claim 6], structural 
error [claims 1 and 8] and ineffective assistance of counsel [claim 10]. All of 
these claims, with the exception of claims of ineffective assistance against 
petitioner's appellate attorneys, are barred because petitioner is not entitled to 
relief on any ground that was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal, or that 
could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal. Utah Code Ann. § 
78-35a-106(b) & (c) (West 2004). 
(emphasis added); Order of Dismissal, R557-60, at 558, \ 3 (Addendum D). 
As noted, petitioner has not challenged the post-conviction court's dismissal of the 
aforementioned eight claims based on procedural bar. Aple. Br. at Pt. I. On that basis alone, 
his appeal fails. Id. Moreover, the court's conclusion that the eight specific claims it 
referenced were procedurally barred is correct. Those claims could have been raised at trial 
or on direct appeal, but were not. See Order of Dismissal at R558, f^ 3 (citing section 
78-35a-106(b) & c). Thus, the court's order dismissing those claims stands, and this Court 
need not consider the merits of those claims. See Taylor, 2007 UT 12, f^ 14 (refusing to 
consider merits of challenges to trial court's decisions or constitutionality of death penalty 
as procedurally barred because they could have been, but were not, raised on direct appeal). 
Petitioner challenges only that part of the court's order dismissing his claim of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.6 Petitioner argues that the United States Supreme 
6
 Petitioner does not specify whether his challenge concerns procedural bar as to 
an ineffective-assistance claim directed toward either or both his trial or appellate 
counsel. Aplt. Br. at 43. However, as the post-conviction court specifically ruled that 
petitioner's ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim was not procedurally barred, 
see Order of Dismissal, R5 57-60, at 558, \ 3, only an argument that an ineffective-
assistance-of-trial-counsel claim cannot be procedurally barred is relevant to this appeal. 
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Court, in United States v. Massaro, 538 U.S. 500 (2003), agreed with ten federal courts of 
appeal that "there is no procedural default for failure to raise and ineffective assistance claim 
on direct appeal." Aplt. Br. at 43. Massaro is inapposite to this appeal. 
Massaro was convicted in a federal district court of murder in aid of racketeering. 
Massaro, 538 U.S. at 502. On direct appeal, his new counsel failed to argue ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel, who had declined the trial court's offer of a mid-trial continuance 
to prepare for evidence that the government withheld until after trial had begun. Id. Massaro 
moved to vacate his conviction under 18 U.S. C. § 2255 (federal post-conviction proceeding), 
arguing the over-looked ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Id. The district court found 
this claim barred because Massaro could have raised it on direct appeal. Id. The United 
States Supreme Court held that failure to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on 
direct appeal does not bar claim from being brought in later, appropriate collateral 
proceeding. Id. at 504. The Court noted that the district court in collateral proceedings was 
"the forum best suited to developing the facts necessary to determining the adequacy of 
representation during an entire trial"— a place where the court could "take evidence from 
witnesses and counsel alleged to have rendered the deficient performance^]" and the parties 
may develop a record "bearing precisely on the . . . issue." Id. at 505-06 (citations omitted). 
Petitioner seizes on Massaro's holding to argue that his ineffective-assistance-of -
counsel claim is not procedurally barred. However, Massaro, is plainly inapplicable to 
petitioner's appeal. First, the Massaro, holding is directed to federal courts applying federal 
statutes, not to state courts rules applying state statutes. Second, the rationale behind the 
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Massaro holding is that a petitioner must be allowed to make a record pertinent to an 
ineffective- assistance-of-trial-counsel claim in federal habeas proceedings because there is 
no such opportunity to do so in the federal criminal proceeding. As discussed below, that 
impediment to making a record in state criminal proceedings in Utah has been removed with 
the adoption of rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
As noted, section 78-35a-106 provides that "[notwithstanding [that a claim is 
procedurally barred because it could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal], a 
person may be eligible for relief on a basis that the ground could have been but was not 
raised at trial or on appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance 
of counsel." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-106(2) (2004). Where, as in this case, a petitioner 
is represented by different counsel on appeal than at trial, this provision necessarily limits a 
claim of ineffective assistance to appellate counsel and excludes a direct claim of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel. 
Before 1992, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel were exempt from the 
rule that a defendant must raise, on direct appeal, all of the errors that allegedly occurred at 
his trial. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ffif 12-13, 12 P.3d 92. The exception was 
necessary for two reasons. First, defendants were often represented on appeal by the same 
counsel who assisted them at trial. Id. Second, even when a defendant had different counsel 
on appeal, the record was often inadequate to adjudicate ineffectiveness claims because most 
ineffectiveness occurred outside the record. Id. Therefore, defendants were sometimes 
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allowed to raise ineffectiveness claims for the first time in post-conviction proceedings, 
rather than on direct appeal. See id 
In 1992, however, rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, was adopted. Id. at 
fflj 14-17. Rule 23B negated the need to treat ineffective assistance claims differently from 
any other claim of trial error. Id. The rule addressed the inadequate record dilemma by 
allowing an appellate court to remand a case to the district court to take evidence and make 
factual findings necessary to resolve an ineffectiveness claim. See Utah R. App. P. 23B; 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 14. As the Utah Supreme Court explained: "If a defendant is 
aware of any 'nonspeculative allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the record on appeal, 
which, if true, could support a determination that counsel was ineffective,' . . . defendant 
bears the primary obligation and burden of moving for a temporary remand." Litherland, 
2000 UT 76, ^ | 16 (quoting Utah R. App. P. 23B). Because society has a compelling interest 
in the finality of judgments, the general rule is that a defendant must raise, on direct appeal, 
all of the errors that allegedly occurred at his trial. See id., 2000 UT 76, fflf 11, 16-17. 
Moreover, in 1996, the PCRA was enacted with provisions that bar a petitioner from 
obtaining relief upon any claim that was raised, or could have been raised on direct appeal. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(l)(c). Therefore, when a defendant is represented on appeal 
by counsel other than trial counsel, he has both the opportunity, and the burden, to raise on 
direct appeal all known claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. See Litherland, 2000 
UT 76 at ffif 9-17; Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(l)(c). 
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Petitioner could have and should have raised on direct appeal his claims that trial 
counsel were ineffective. He was not represented by the same counsel at trial and on appeal. 
He was represented by Ron Yengich and Bradley Rich at trial. See, e.g., R. 23-24, He was 
represented on appeal by Scott Wiggins. See Allen, 2005 UT 11. On appeal, petitioner had 
not only the opportunity, but also the burden to raise all claims, including ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel, and, if necessary, to move for a temporary remand under Rule 23B 
to create an adequate record for reviewing any ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims. 
See Litherland, 12 P.3d^f 16. Here, all of petitioner's current claims of ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel were known to petitioner at the time of his appeal. To the extent that 
petitioner's ineffectiveness claims against his trial counsel can be identified from the petition, 
they appear to be that his trial counsel (1) was "constructively" ineffective because he was 
"hesitant to offend" the trial judge, who was allegedly "partial[] toward the State and [made] 
rulings which are representative of a pro-state bias," and (2) "stipulated to a number of 
issues without Mr. Allen being present." R82-83. Thus, to the extent that these claims are 
alleged directly against trial counsel in post-conviction proceedings, these claims clearly 
could have been raised on direct appeal. Consequently, the post-conviction court correctly 
concluded that they, too, were procedurally barred and should be dismissed.7 See Order of 
Dismissal, at R558, f^ 3. In sum, the Court should hold that the post-conviction court 
correctly dismissed the eight claims based on procedural bar. 
7
 As stated, the only way to attack trial counsel's ineffectiveness is to attack 
appellate counsel's ineffectiveness. Aple. Br. at Pt. II, pp. 20-23. 
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B. Although unnecessary following its application of procedural bar, 
the post-conviction court nevertheless impliedly concluded that claims 
that jurors were not fair and impartial (claim 3) and that the trial court's 
errors resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial (claim 8) were meritless. 
The post-conviction court also disposed of petitioner's claims 3 and 8 on the merits, 
even though it found them procedurally barred.8 See Order of Dismissal, at 558-59. As 
listed by the court, claim 3 asserts that the "[j]urors were not fair and impartiar, and claim 
8 asserts that "[e]rror for the trial court resulted] in a trial that was fundamentally unfair." 
See Order to Respond, R201-02. 
These two claims appear to have been based primarily on the affidavit of Trenton 
David, dated June 28, 2005. See Petition, R79-80; Addendum I to Petition, R192-93 
(Addendum F). In apparent support of claim 3, Mr. David asserted that he "witnessed jurors 
disregarding instructions from the court not to expose one self [sic] to Media, and to not 
discuss []case with other jury members during the trial." R193 at^ f 11. He also asserted that 
he "felt other jurors had bias [sic] opinions before trial began, from exposure from the 
media." Id. at f^ 12. 
In apparent support of claim 8, Mr. David asserted that the jury requested George 
Taylor's trial testimony, which he asserted was "in conflict" with the testimony of another 
8
 Beyond the general ground for applying procedural bar—that petitioner could 
have raised claim 3 on appeal but did not— there is the more specific ground that the 
claim was raised and disposed of on direct appeal. In his direct appeal, petitioner alleged 
juror misconduct based on a juror having received information from the media through 
her husband concerning the defense's mistrial motion. Allen, 2007 UT 11, Tflf 45, 47-49, 
52. That claim was founded on the same information on which claim 3 is based and is 
substantially similar to it. This Court held that there was no juror misconduct. Id. at ^ 54. 
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witness, Toby White, and "would have proved that Taylor was fabricating his testimony for 
self gain." R192, at ffif 2, 8-9. Mr. David asserted that if he had received the requested 
testimony, "it was very likely that [he] would have found Paul Allen innocent of all charges." 
Rl92-93 at ffl[ 4,10. "Unfortunately," Mr. David asserted, "Judge Dawson denied allowing 
trial testimony to jurors during trial." R192 at ^ 7. 
The post-conviction court granted the State's motion to strike the affidavit as it 
violated rule 606(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, "which prohibits a juror's testimony, by 
affidavit or otherwise, concerning jury deliberations." R559, f^ 6.9 Utah's appellate courts 
have consistently held such testimony inadmissible to challenge a verdict. See e.g., State v. 
DeMille, 756 P.2d 81, 84 (Utah 1988); State v. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1,4 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
In State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243 (Utah 1992) {Thomas IT), Justice Durham considered the 
scope of rule 606(b) in connection with juror untruthfulness in voir dire and concluded that 
a juror could testify as to the existence of extraneous information, "[but] not as to how far 
that influence operated on his mind." 830 P.2d at 249 (Durham, J., writing for majority). See 
9
 Rule 606(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides: 
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror 
may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of 
the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other 
juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent 
from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in 
connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question 
whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to bear 
upon any juror. Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by 
the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded 
from testifying be received for these purposes. 
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id. at 249 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 252 (Howe, J. and Hall, C.J., dissenting) (all 
disparaging use of testimony of discussions in deliberations to impeach the verdict). 
Here, Mr. David's statements about other jurors' alleged bias (claim 3) and the effect 
the trial court's refusal to provide a witness's transcribed testimony had on his vote (claim 
8) is plainly proscribed by rule 606(b). The post-conviction court so concluded: "Because 
the juror affidavit purports to testify to matters concerning jury deliberations, it violates rule 
606(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which prohibits a juror's testimony, by affidavit or 
otherwise, concerning jury deliberations." R559, f 6. Thus, the court's ruling striking the 
affidavit was correct. Because the striking of the affidavit removed any factual basis for 
claims 3 and 8, the court impliedly found both claims meritless. 
C. The post-conviction court correctly concluded that petitioner's claim of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was too vague and speculative 
to satisfy his burden under the PCRA. 
"[T]o demonstrate the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a [post-conviction] 
petitioner must first show that his counsel was objectively unreasonable in failing to find 
arguable issues to appeal-that is, that counsel unreasonably failed to discover nonfrivolous 
issues and to file a merits brief raising them." Benvenuto v. State, 2007 UT 53, *f 24 , 
P.3d . "[T]he proper standard for evaluating [a petitioner's] claim that appellate counsel 
was ineffective in neglecting to file a merits brief is that enunciated in Strickland v. 
Washington, [466 U.S. 668 (1984)]."). Id. (citing Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 
(2000)). "If [a petitioner] succeeds in such a showing, he then has the burden of 
demonstrating prejudice." Id. "That is, he must show a reasonable probability that, but for 
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his counsel's unreasonable failure to file a merits brief, he would have prevailed on his 
appeal." Id. (citing Robbins, 528 U.S. at 285). As stated, under the PCRA, the petitioner 
bears the burden to show that he is entitled to relief by a preponderance of the evidence. See 
Utah Code Ann. 78-35a-105. 
The post-conviction court dismissed petitioner's ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel claims because it concluded that they were "too vague and speculative to meet his 
burden under either the first or second Stricklandprong[s]." See Order of Dismissal, R559, 
The record supports the court's ruling. In support of his claim, the petition and, 
accordingly, petitioner's brief, state only the following: 
[T] he defense was constructively ineffective due to the court's partiality 
towards the State and rulings which are representative of a pro-state bias. For 
example, the multiplicitous/duplicitous counts, the coercive "Allen" 
instructions, the "Special Verdict Form," and the one-sided rulings given in 
favor of the State. Mr. Allen's attorney stipulated to a number of issues 
without Mr. Allen being present. This violated Mr. Allen's right to be present 
at all trial proceedings which have a bearing on the outcome of trial. See 
Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (per curiam) (1983). 
During a number of in camera proceedings the judge essentially argued the 
State's case and then ruled upon those judgments. . . . Mr. Yengich (my 
lawyer) as an officer of the court would obviously be hesitant to offend a judge 
(with apparent Pro-State leanings) who was presiding over the case at bar. 
R82-83;Aplt.Br.at42-43. 
Petitioner makes no explicit, detailed claims against his appellate attorneys in his 
petition or any other pleading. The only claims of ineffective assistance articulated in the 
petition and its supporting memorandum concern his trial attorneys, and those claims, as 
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discussed, were properly held to be procedurally barred. Aple. Br. at Pt. IIA. Indeed, the 
first two sentences of his claim appear more directed to judicial bias than to ineffective 
assistance. The final sentence, suggesting Mr. Yengich's "hesitanfce] to offend a judge with 
apparent pro-State leanings," again seems to emphasize judicial bias, as opposed to 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Any suggestion that this final point really constitutes a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, as opposed to a rant against the court, is rebutted 
by the complete absence of authority by which ineffective assistance of counsel is measured 
or any analysis of how petitioner's counsel was ineffective or how his was prejudiced. 
Arguably, petitioner's assertion, that "[his] attorney stipulated to a number of issues 
without [petitioner] being present" and thereby violated his rights, may be regarded as a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. R83; Aplt. Br. at 44. However, as stated above, 
the assertion does not clearly attack appellate counsel's performance. The statement does 
not indicate what "issues" Mr. Yengich stipulated to in his absence. The statement is 
unsupported by any record citation or any record facts that would help substantiate a claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
In sum, the post-conviction court rightly concluded that petitioner's claims were "too 
vague and speculative" to satisfy his burden under Strickland. R559, U 5. The court might 
also have reasonably concluded that the claim was inadequately briefed. See Aple. Br. at Pt. 
I. 
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D. The post-conviction court correctly concluded that the trial court rightly 
chose not to provide the jurors with testimony of prosecution witnesses. 
Notwithstanding the vague and speculative nature of petitioner' s inadequately briefed 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, the court considered its one arguable aspect. It 
considered whether appellate counsel ineffectively failed to argue that trial counsel were 
ineffective when they stipulated to not giving prosecution witnesses' trial testimony to the 
jury. R448-457. The court, however, apparently did not rule on the issue as though it was 
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Order of Dismissal, R558,14. Rather, it 
concluded that the trial court acted properly, even if defendant was not present. Id. In so 
doing, the post-conviction court essentially ruled that trial counsel did not perform 
deficiently. See Benvenuto v. State, 2007 UT 53, ^ 24 ("Failure to raise an issue that is 
without merit 'does not constitute constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel' because 
the Sixth Amendment does not require an attorney to raise every nonfrivolous issue on 
appeal") (quoting Carter III, 2001 UT 96, \ 48) (quoting Banks v. Reynolds, 54 F.3d 1508, 
1515 (10th Cir. 1995)); State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 4l,1f 26, 1 P.3d 546 ("Failure to raise futile 
objections does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel."). That ruling was correct. 
See State v. Medina-Juarez, 2001 UT 79, ^ 14, 34 P.3d 187 ("fail[ure] to establish either of 
the two parts of the Strickland'test, [establishes that] counsel's assistance was constitutionally 
sufficient, and [the court] need not address the other part of the test."). 
A defendant has a right to be present "at all trial proceedings which have a bearing 
on the outcome of the trial." Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 118 (1983)). See also State v. 
29 
Lee, 585 P.2d 58 (Utah 1978). "The constitutional right to presence is rooted to a large 
extent in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, but [the U.S. Supreme Court 
has] recognized that this right is protected by the Due Process Clause in some situations 
where the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him.'9 United 
States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985) (citation omitted). 
However, a defendant's presence at all court proceedings is not required. As the 
Supreme Court stated long ago: "[T]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due process 
to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent 
only." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-08 (1934) (emphasis added). Thus, 
Gagnon, in interpreting the Snyder rule, found that the defendants' due process rights were 
not violated when they were not present during an in camera discussion between the judge 
and a juror concerning the juror's prejudice toward one of the defendants. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 
at 527. Other courts have specifically held that a defendant's right to presence is not violated 
by exclusion from post-verdict proceedings. Polizziv. United States, 550 F.2d 1133 (9th Cir. 
1976). Courts have also stated that not all contact between the judge and a juror requires the 
defendant's presence. See, e.g., State v. Baca, 950 P.2d 776, 785, ^ 38 (N.M. 1997) ("A 
judge violates a defendant's right to be present at every stage of his trial only if the judge's 
discussion with a juror concerns the subject matter of the case"). In short, there is no 
constitutional violation where the communications between the judge and jury are not 
relevant to the substance of the case. 
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Disregarding, arguendo, petitioner's lack of specificity, the only proceedings for 
which petitioner apparently was not present were four conferences with attorneys to discuss 
responses to written questions from jurors.10 See Motion to Dismiss, R238-61, at 258-59. 
The first three conferences dealt only with mundane matters—a request for a tape recorder 
to play an exhibit, how late in the evening the court expected the jurors to deliberate on a 
given night, and whether jurors could call home or a juror could feed her baby on break. See 
id. 
Only the fourth inquiry dealt with a matter relevant to the substance of case—the 
jury's request for the testimony of two prosecution witnesses, George Taylor and Toby White 
and the immunity agreement for Jennie Wright. See Motion to Dismiss, R259 (citing 
Criminal R792; 2060:1875). The State and defense counsel both opposed this request. See 
State's Reply Memorandum in Support of State's Motion to Dismiss Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief ("Reply Memorandum"), R439-63, at 454 (citing Criminal R2060:1875). 
The trial court drafted a response to the note, which was approved by the prosecutor and 
defense attorney, advising jurors that they had to rely on their memories of the witnesses' 
testimonies. See Reply Memorandum , R454 (citing Criminal R792). 
The post-conviction court ruled that the trial court correctly chose not to provide the 
jurors with the witnesses' testimony: 
10
 Petitioner states that there were other hearings at which he was not present. 
R487-88. Even assuming the post-conviction court considered these alleged instances, 
they cannot be corroborated or evaluated for their effect without an official record of the 
trial proceedings, which is absent in this case. 
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Petitioner also challenged the trial court's denial of the jurors' request that 
testimony of prosecution witnesses be provided to them during their 
deliberations. Upon receipt of the jurors' request, the court conferenced 
with counsel for the State and the defendant. All agreed that the testimony 
should not be provided. This accords with the rules of criminal procedure 
and was therefore appropriate. See Utah R. Crim. P. 17(m). Accordingly, 
petitioner's challenge to that ruling is without merit. 
Order of Dismissal, R558, j^ 4.11 That ruling is correct. 
Under rule 17(m), although a defendant has a right to be present when the court 
responds to a jury's inquiry on a matter of law, he or she has no the right to have input on the 
trial court's response to that inquiry. See State v. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1,4 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
(rejecting defendant's claim that trial judge should have consulted with defendant and 
counsel before responding to jury question).12 But even if the post-conviction court's 
11
 Petitioner nowhere claims that the post-conviction court erred by not ruling on 
whether the trial court improperly refused to provide the jury with Jennie Wright's 
immunity agreement. 
12
 Rule 17, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, states: 
After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be 
informed on any point of law arising in the case, they shall inform the 
officer in charge of them, who shall communicate such request to the court. 
The court may then direct that the jury be brought before the court where, in 
the presence of the defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to 
the inquiry or advise the jury that no further instructions shall be given. 
Such response shall be recorded. The court may in its discretion respond to 
the inquiry in writing without having the jury brought before the court, in 
which case the inquiry and the response thereto shall be entered in the 
record. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 17(m). Paragraph (m) was redesignated as paragraph (n) after rule 17 
was amended in 2002. Utah R. Crim. P. 17 advisory committee's note. Therefore, 
paragraph (m), as set out above, would have been the applicable provision had this matter 
been at issue in February 2000, when petitioner was tried. 
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conclusion were erroneous, petitioner has failed to show that he was prejudiced by his 
absence at the particular conference. See United States v. Gomez, 67 F.3d 1515, 1528 (10th 
Cir. 1995) ("A deprivation of the constitutional right to be present at every critical stage of 
the trial is still subject to harmless error analysis.") (citing Rogers v. United States, Ml U.S. 
35, 40 (1975). See also State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, | 29, 52 P.3d 1210 ("Second, the 
defendant must show that counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial . . . .") (citing 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 19) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88)). Here, petitioner's 
argument that he was prejudiced requires a showing that his presence at the conference 
would likely have led to a different outcome at trial. Petitioner has not made that showing. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that petitioner would have resisted his counsel's stipulation, 
he has not argued that he would also not have opposed providing the jury with the witnesses' 
testimony. More importantly, he cannot show that his presence would have had any effect 
on the prosecutor's refusal to provide the jury with the testimony. The prosecutor opposed 
the request for good reason. The general rule is that having portions of the unofficial 
transcript read to the jury is "disfavored" because of its tendency to overemphasize that 
testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Keys, 899 F.2d 983,988 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing United 
States v. Nolan, 700 F.2d 479, 486 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 462 U.S. 1123 (1983)); accord 
State v. Hines, 307 P.2d 887, 889 (Utah 1957) ("It is . . . essential that the court observe 
caution that evidence is not so selected, nor used in such a manner, that there is likelihood 
of it being given undue weight or emphasis by the jury . . . .") Because the prosecutor 
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objected to this "disfavored" practice and likely would have continued to do so even if 
petitioner disagreed, it is highly likely that the jury's request would have still been denied. 
Finally, petitioner cannot use the juror affidavit to attempt to bolster any claim of 
prejudice. As the post-conviction court correctly determined, Mr. David's affidavit had to 
be stricken under rule 606(b). See Order of Dismissal, R559, f 6. Thus, it cannot be used 
to show that there is a reasonable probability that Mr. David would have voted for acquittal 
if the testimony had been provided to him. In sum, petitioner has failed to show that, even 
on the highly speculative assumption that his rights were violated when he was not present 
at the conference between the judge and attorneys, he was prejudiced—i.e., that absent any 
error there was a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons argued above, the Court should affirm the dismissal of the petition. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this , 2 7 day of August, 2007. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
Assistant Attorney General 
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§ 78—2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state 
law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to 
final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating 
with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; 
(v) the state engineer; or 
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources re-
viewing actions of the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudi-
cative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (3)(e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the Constitu-
tion of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a 
first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a first 
degree felony or capital felony; 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees ruling 
on legislative subpoenas. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a 
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
Laws 1986, c. 47, § 41; Laws 1987, c. 161, § 303; Laws 1988, c. 248, § 5; Laws 1989, 
c. 67, § 1; Laws 1992, c. 127, § 11; Laws 1994, c. 191, § 2; Laws 1995, c. 267, § 5, eff. 
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§ 78—2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and 
to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service 
Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions re-
viewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, 
Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the 
state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except 
those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving 
a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except 
petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging 
the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a 
first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, includ-
ing, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, 
support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
Laws 1986, c. 47, § 46; Laws 1987, c. 161, § 304; Laws 1988, c. 73, § 1; Laws 1988, c. 
210, § 141; Laws 1988, c. 248, § 8; Laws 1990, c. 80, § 5; Laws 1990, c. 224, § 3; 
Laws 1991, c. 268, § 22; Laws 1992, c. 127, § 12; Laws 1994, c. 13, § 45; Laws 1995, 
c. 299, § 47, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 159, § 19, eff. July 1, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 
198, § 49, eff. July 1, 1996; Laws 2001, c. 255, § 20, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2001, c. 
302, § 2, eff. April 30, 2001. 
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§ 7 8 - 3 5 a - l G 5 . Burden of proof 
The petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of 
the evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief. The respon-
dent has the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion under Section 
78-35a-106, but once a ground has been pled, the petitioner has the burden to 
disprove its existence by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Laws 1996, c. 235, § 5, eff. April 29, 1996. 
§ 7 8 - 3 5 a - 1 0 6 . Preclusion of relief—Exception 
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground 
that: 
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion; 
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal; 
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal; 
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction 
relief or could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for post-
conviction relief; or 
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a 
basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, 
if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Laws 1996, c. 235, § 6, eff. April 29, 1996. 
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
RULE 3 . APPEAL AS OF RIGHT: HOW TAKEN 
(a) Filing Appeal From Final Orders and Judgments. An appeal may be 
taken from a district or juvenile court to the appellate court with jurisdiction 
over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as otherwise 
provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court 
within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take any step other 
than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the 
appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate court deems 
appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short 
of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees. 
(b) Joint or Consolidated Appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to 
appeal from a judgment or order and their interests are such as to make joinder 
practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or may join in an appeal of 
another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint appeals may 
proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual appeals may be 
consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its own motion or upon 
motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the separate appeals. 
(c) Designation of Parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as the 
appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or 
proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where 
otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the 
appellate court, the party making the original application shall be known as the 
petitioner and any other party as the respondent. 
(d) Content of Notice of Appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the party 
or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or part 
thereof, appealed from; shall designate the court from which the appeal is 
taken; and shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken. 
(e) Service of Notice of Appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give notice 
of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy 
thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the 
party is not represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last known 
address. A certificate evidencing such service shall be filed with the notice of 
appeal. If counsel of record is served, the certificate of service shall designate 
the name of the party represented by that counsel. 
(f) Filing Fee in Civil Appeals. At the time of filing any notice of separate, 
joint, ortross appeal in a civil case, the party taking the appeal shall pay to the 
clerk/of the trial court the filing fee established by law. The clerk of the trial 
court shall not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing fee is paid. 
(gi Docketing of Appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal and payment 
of thV required fee, the clerk of the trial court shall immediately transmit a 
certified copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of its filing, and a copy 
of the bohd required by Rule 6 or a certification by the clerk that the bond has 
been filed, to the clerk of the appellate court. Upon receipt of the copy of the 
notice of appeal, the clerk of the appellate court shall enter the appeal upon the 
docket. An appeal shall be docketed under the title given to the action in the 
trial court, with the appellant identified as such, but if the title does not contain 
the name of the appellant, such name shall be added to the title. 
[Amended effective October 1, 1992; November 1, 1996; November 1, 1999.] 
RULE 11. THE RECORD ON APPEAL. 
(a) Composition of the record on appeal. The original papers and exhibits 
filed in the trial court, including the presentence report in criminal matters, the 
transcript of proceedings, if any, the index prepared by the clerk of the trial 
court, and the docket sheet, shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases. 
A copy of the record certified by the clerk of the trial court to conform to the 
original may be substituted for the original as the record on appeal. Only those 
papers prescribed under paragraph (d) of this rule shall be transmitted to the 
appellate court. 
(b) Pagination and indexing of record. 
(b)(1) Immediately upon filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the trial 
court shall securely fasten the record in a trial court case file, with collation in 
the following order: 
(b)(1)(A) the index prepared by the clerk; 
(b)(1)(B) the docket sheet; 
(b)(1)(C) all original papers in chronological order; 
(b)(1)(D) all published depositions in chronological order; 
(b)(1)(E) all transcripts prepared for appeal in chronological order; 
(b)(1)(F) a list of all exhibits offered in the proceeding; and 
(b)(1)(G) in criminal cases, the presentence investigation report. 
(b)(2)(A) The clerk shall mark the bottom right corner of every page of the 
collated index, docket sheet, and all original papers as well as the cover page 
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only of all published depositions and the cover page only of each volume of 
transcripts constituting the record with a sequential number using one series of 
numerals for the entire record. 
(b)(2)(B) If a supplemental record is forwarded to the appellate court, the 
clerk shall collate the papers, depositions, and transcripts of the supplemental 
record in the same order as the original record and mark the bottom right 
corner of each page of the collated original papers as well as the cover page 
only of all published depositions and the cover page only of each volume of 
transcripts constituting the supplemental record with a sequential number 
beginning with the number next following the number of the last page of the 
original record. 
(b)(3) The clerk shall prepare a chronological index of the record. The index 
shall contain a reference to the date on which the paper, deposition or 
transcript was filed in the trial court and the starting page of the record on 
which the paper, deposition or transcript will be found. 
(b)(4) Clerks of the trial and appellate courts shall establish rules and 
procedures for checking out the record after pagination for use by the parties in 
preparing briefs for an appeal or in preparing or briefing a petition for writ of 
certiorari. 
(c) Duty of appellant. After filing the notice of appeal, the appellant, or in 
the event that more than one appeal is taken, each appellant, shall comply with 
the provisions of paragraphs (d) and (e) of this rule and shall take any other 
action necessary to enable the clerk of the trial court to assemble and transmit 
the record. A single record shall be transmitted. 
(d) Papers on appeal. 
(d)(1) Criminal cases. All of the papers in a criminal case shall be included 
by the clerk of the trial court as part of the record on appeal. 
(d)(2) Civil cases. Unless otherwise directed by the appellate court upon sua 
sponte motion or motion of a party, the clerk of the trial court shall include all 
of the papers in a civil case as part of the record on appeal. 
(d)(3) Agency cases. Unless otherwise directed by the appellate court upon 
sua sponte motion or motion of a party, the agency shall include all papers in 
the agency file as part of the record. 
(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant to order; notice to 
appellee if partial transcript is ordered. 
(e)(1) Request for transcript; time for filing. Within 10 days after filing the 
notice of appeal, the appellant shall request from the court executive a tran-
script of such parts of the proceedings not already on file as the appellant 
deems necessary. The request shall be in writing and shall state that the 
transcript is needed for purposes of an appeal. Within the same period, a copy 
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court and the clerk of the appellate 
court. If the appellant desires a transcript in a compressed format, appellant 
shall include the request for a compressed format within the request for 
transcript. If no such parts of the proceedings are to be requested, within the 
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same period the appellant shall file a certificate to that effect with the clerk of 
the trial court and a copy with the clerk of the appellate court. 
(e)(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged finding or con-
elusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion 
is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in 
the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. 
Neither the court nor the appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficien-
cies in providing the relevant portions of the transcript. 
(e)(3) Statement of issues; cross-designation by appellee. Unless the entire 
transcript is to be included, the appellant shall, within 10 days after filing the 
notice of appeal, file a statement of the issues that will be presented on appeal 
and sh&ll serve on the appellee a copy of the request or certificate and a copy of 
the statement. If the appellee deems a transcript of other parts of the 
proceedings to be necessary, the appellee shall, within 10 days after the service 
of the-request or certificate and the statement of the appellant, file and serve on 
the appellant a designation of additional parts to be included. Unless within 10 
days after service of such designation the appellant has requested such parts 
and has so notified the appellee, the appellee may within the following 10 days 
either request the parts or move in the trial court for an order requiring the 
appellant to do so. 
(f) Agreed statement as the record on appeal. In lieu of the record on 
appeal as defined in paragraph (a) of this rule, the parties may prepare and sign 
a statement of the case, showing how the issues presented by the appeal arose 
and were decided in the trial court and setting forth only so many of the facts 
averred and proved or sought to be proved as are essential to a decision of the 
issues presented. If the statement conforms to the truth, it, together with such 
additions as the trial court may consider necessary fully to present the issues 
raised by the appeal, shall be approved by the trial court. The clerk of the trial 
court shall transmit the statement to the clerk of the appellate court within the 
time prescribed by Rule 12(b)(2). The clerk of the trial court shall transmit the 
index of the record to the clerk of the appellate court upon approval of the 
statement by the trial court. 
(g) Statement of evidence or proceedings when no report was made or when 
transcript is unavailable. If no report of the evidence or proceedings at a 
hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is unavailable, or if the appellant is 
impecunious and unable to afford a transcript in a civil case, the appellant may 
prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best available 
means, including recollection. The statement shall be served on the' appellee, 
who may serve objections or propose amendments within 10 days after service. 
The statement and any objections or proposed amendments shall be submitted 
to the trial court for settlement and approval and, as settled and approved, shall 
be included by the clerk of the trial court in the record on appeal. 
(h) Correction or modification of the record. If any difference arises as to 
whether the record truly discloses what occurred in the trial court, the 
difference shall be submitted to and settled by that court and the record made 
to conform to the truth. If anything material to either party is omitted from the 
record by error or accident or is misstated, the parties by stipulation, the trial 
court, or the appellate court, either before or after the record is transmitted, 
may direct that the omission or misstatement be corrected and if necessary that 
a supplemental record be certified and transmitted. The moving party, or the 
court if it is acting on its own initiative, shall serve on the1 parties a statement of 
the proposed changes. Within 10 days after service, any party may serve 
objections to the proposed changes. All other questions as to the form and 
content of the record shall be presented to the appellate court. 
[Amended effective October 1/ 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995; January 1, 1998; April 
1, 1998; November 1, 1999; April 1, 2001; November 1, 2002; November 1, 2004; 
April 1, 2005.] 
RULE 23B. MOTION TO REMAND FOR FINDINGS NECESSARY TO 
DETERMINATION OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUN-
SEL CLAIM 
(a) Grounds for Motion; Time* A party to an appeal in a criminal case may 
move the court to remand the case to the trial court for entry of findings of fact, 
necessary for the appellate court's determination of a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. The motion shall be available only upon a nonspecula-
tive allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if 
true, could support a determination that counsel was ineffective. 
The motion shall be filed prior to the filing of the appellant's brief. Upon a 
showing of good cause, the court may permit a motion to be filed after the filing 
of the appellant's brief. In no event shall the court permit a motion to be filed 
after oral argument. Nothing in this rule shall prohibit the court from 
remanding the case under this rule on its own motion at any time if the claim 
has been raised and the motion would have been available to a party. 
(b) Content of Motion; Response; Reply. The content of the motion shall 
conform to the requirements of Rule 23. The motion shall include or be 
accompanied by affidavits alleging facts not fully appearing in the record on 
appeal that show the claimed deficient performance of the attorney. The 
affidavits shall also allege facts that show the claimed prejudice suffered by the 
appellant as a result of the claimed deficient performance. The motion shall 
also be accompanied by a proposed order or remand that identifies the 
ineffectiveness claims and specifies the factual issues relevant to each such 
claim to be addressed on remand. 
A response shall be filed within 20 days after the motion is filed. The 
response shall include a proposed order of remand that identifies the ineffec-
tiveness claims and specifies the factual issues relevant to each such claim to be 
addressed by the trial court in the event remand is granted, unless the 
responding party accepts that proposed by the moving party. Any reply shall be 
filed within 10 days after the response is filed. 
(c) Order of the Court. If the requirements of parts (a) and (b) of this rule 
have been met, the court may order that the case be temporarily remanded to 
the trial court for the purpose of entry of findings of fact relevant to a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. The order of remand shall identify the 
ineffectiveness claims and specify the factual issues relevant to each such claim 
to be addressed by the trial court. The order shall also direct the trial court to 
complete the proceedings on remand within 90 days of issuance of the order of 
remand, absent a finding by the trial court of good cause for a delay of 
reasonable length. 
If it appears to the appellate court that the appellant's attorney of record on 
the appeal faces a conflict of interest upon remand, the court shall direct that 
(d) Effect on Appeal, Oral argument and the deadlines for briefs shall be 
vacated upon the filing of a motion to remand under this rule. Other procedur-
al steps required by* these rules shall not be stayed by a motion for remand, 
unless a stay is ordered by the court upon stipulation or motion of the parties or 
upon the court's motion. 
(e) Proceedings Before the Trial Court. Upon remand the trial court shall 
promptly conduct hearings and take evidence as necessary to enter the findings 
of fact necessary to determine the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Any claims of ineffectiveness not identified in the order of remand shall not be 
considered by the trial court on remand, unless the trial court determines that 
the interests of justice or judicial efficiency require consideration of issues not 
specifically identified in the order of remand. Evidentiary hearings shall be 
conducted without a jury and as soon as practicable after remand. The burden 
of proving a fact shall be upon the proponent of the fact. The standard of proof 
shall be a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court shall enter written 
findings of fact concerning the claimed deficient performance by counsel and 
the claimed prejudice suffered by appellant as a result, in accordance with the 
order of remand. Proceedings on remand shall be completed within 90 days of 
entry of the order of remand, unless the trial court finds good cause for a delay 
of reasonable length. 
(fTPreparation and Transmittal of the Record. At the conclusion of all 
proceedings before the trial court, the clerk of the trial court and the court 
reporter shall immediately prepare the record of the supplemental proceedings 
as required by these rules. If the record of the original proceedings before the 
trial court has been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of the trial 
court shall immediately transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings 
upon preparation of the supplemental record. If the record of the original 
proceedings before the trial court has not been transmitted to the appellate 
court, the clerk of the court shall transmit the record of the supplemental 
proceedings upon the preparation of the entire record. 
(g) Appellate Court Determination. Upon receipt of the record from the 
trial court, the clerk of the court shall notify the parties of the new schedule for 
briefing or oral argument under these rules. Errors claimed to have been 
made during the trial court proceedings conducted pursuant to this rule are 
reviewable under the same standards as the review of errors in other appeals. 
The findings of fact entered pursuant to this rule are reviewable under the same 
standards as the review of findings of fact in other appeals. 
[Adopted effective October 1, 1992; amended effective April 1, 1998 ] 
RULE 24 . BRIEFS 
(a) Brief of the appellant The brief of the appellant shall contain under 
appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agenc^ 
whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of 
the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties., The list should be 
set out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum^ with page 
references. 
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to 
the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
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(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each 
issue: the standard of appellate review with supporting aulhority; and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the 
trial court; or 
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved 
in the trial court. 
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to 
the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the 
pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the 
provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) of 
this rule. 
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the 
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court 
below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall 
follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be 
supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this 
rule. 
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably para-
graphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in 
the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under 
which the argument is arranged. 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons 
of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for 
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a 
fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged 
finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall 
state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award. 
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(a)(ll) An addendum to the brief or a statement that "no addendum is 
necessary under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the 
brief unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is 
bound separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The adden-
dum shall contain a copy of: 
(a)(ll)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central 
importance cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(a)(ll)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a "copy of the Court of 
Appeals opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the 
appeal but not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter 
service; and 
(a)(ll)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance 
to the determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings 
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of fact and conclusions^ of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the 
court's oral decision, or the contract OP document -subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief o£ the appellee shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not 
include: 
(b)(1)" a ^statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatis-
fied with the statement of the appellant; or 
(b)(2) .ari addendum, "except to provide material not included in the adden-
dum of the- appellant. , The appellee may refer to the addendum of the 
appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the 
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in 
reply to the response^ of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-
appeal, Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in 
the opposing Tirief.^ The content of the reply brief shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further 
briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties- Counsel will be expected in their briefs 
and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such 
designations as*~"appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity, io use the 
designations used~in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual 
name^ of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the injured 
person,"/'the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages 
of the originaLrecqrd as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any 
statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursu-
ant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of published depositions or 
transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of each 
volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately 
numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by 
the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. 
If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, 
reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was 
identified, offered, and received or rejected. 
(f) Length of briefs'. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall 
not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of 
pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum 
containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by 
paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of 
this rule sets forth the length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals.» If a cross-appeal is filed, the 
party first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant, unless the 
parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders. Each party shall be 
entitled to file two briefs. No brief shall exceed 50 pages, and no party's briefs 
shall in combination exceed 75 pages. 
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the 
issues raised in the appeal 
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and 
Cross-Appellant, which shall respond to the issues raised in the Brief of 
Appellant and present the issues raised in the cross-appeal. 
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant 
and Brief of Cross-Appellee, which shall reply to the Brief of Appellee and 
respond to the Brief of Cross-Appellant. 
(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which 
shall reply to the Brief of Cross-Appellee. 
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the 
cflurt for good cause shown may upon motion permit a party to file a brief that 
exceeds the limitations of this rule. The motion shall state with specificity the 
issues to be briefed, the number of additional pages requested, and the good 
cause for granting the motion. A motion filed at least seven days before the 
date the brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be 
accompanied by a copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before 
the date the brief is due and seeking more than 5 additional pages shall be 
accompanied by a copy of the draft brief for in camera inspection. If the 
motion is granted, any responding party is entitled to an equal number of 
additional pages without further order of the court. Whether the motion is 
granted or denied, the draft brief will be destroyed by the court. 
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases 
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for 
purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any 
appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another. 
Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant 
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been 
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise 
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original 
letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original letter 
and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a 
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the 
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for the 
supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing and 
shall be similarly limited. 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, 
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free 
from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which 
are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte 
by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending 
lawyer. 
[Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995; April 1, 1998; 
November 1, 1999; April 1, 2003; November 1, 2004; April 1, 2006; November 1, 
2006.] 
RULES OF EVIDENCE 
RULE 606. COMPETENCY OF JUROR AS WITNESS 
(a) At the Trial. A member of the jury may not testify as a witness before 
that jury in the trial of the case in which the juror is sitting. If the juror is 
called so to testify, the opposing party shall be afforded an opportunity to object 
out of the presence of the jury. 
(b) Inquiry Into Validity of Verdict or Indictment. Upon an inquiry into the 
validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or 
statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect 
of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the 
juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or* concerning the 
juror's mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify 
on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly 
brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly 
brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any 
statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be 
precluded from testifying be received for these purposes. 
[Amended effective October 1, 1992.] 
Advisory Committee Note 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, law, State v. Gee, 28 Utah 2d 96, 498 P.2d 
and comports with Rules 41 and 44, Utah 662 (1972). 
Rules of Evidence (1971), and Utah case 
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
RULE 17. THE TRIAL 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel. The defendant shall be personally present at the trial 
with the following exceptions: 
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may consent 
in writing to trial in his absence; 
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's 
voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for trial 
shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered 
therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been present; and 
(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial for good cause 
shown which may include tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous conduct. 
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require the personal 
attendance of the defendant at the trial. 
(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be tried in the following order: 
(1) misdemeanor cases when defendant is in custody; 
(2) felony cases when defendant is in custody; 
(3) felony cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance; and 
(4) misdemeanor cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance. 
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a jury in 
open court with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution. 
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes 
written demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders otherwise. 
No jury shall be allowed in the trial of an infraction. 
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial jury shall be as specified in 
Section 78-46-5, U.C.A. 1953. 
(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may, with the consent of the 
accused and the approval of the court, by stipulation in writing or made orally 
in open court, proceed to trial or complete a trial then in progress with any 
number of jurors less than otherwise required. 
(g) After the jury has been impaneled and sworn, the trial shall proceed in 
the following order: 
(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated; 
(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening statement and the de-
fense may make an opening statement or reserve it until the prosecution has 
rested; 
(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the charge; 
(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may present its case; 
(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the court, 
for good cause, otherwise permits; 
(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate time, the 
court shall instruct the jury; and 
(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side or on both sides 
without argument, the prosecution shall open the argument, the defense shall 
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follow and the prosecution may close by responding to the defense argument, 
The court may set reasonable limits upon the argument of counsel for each 
party and the time to be allowed for argument. 
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified during trial and an 
alternate juror has been selected, the case shall proceed using the alternate 
juror. If no alternate has been selected, the parties may stipulate to proceed 
with the number of jurors remaining. Otherwise, the jury shall be discharged 
and a new trial ordered. 
(i) Questions by jurors. A judge may invite jurors to submit written' ques-
tions to a witness as provided in this section. 
(1) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge shall control the 
process to ensure the jury maintains its role as the impartial finder of fact and 
does not become an investigative body. The judge may disallow any question 
from a juror and may discontinue questions from jurors at any time. 
(2) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge should advise 
the jurors that they may write the question as it occurs to them and submit the 
question to the bailiff for transmittal to the judge. The judge should advise the 
jurors that some questions might not be allowed. 
(3) The judge shall review the question with counsel and unrepresented 
parties and rule upon any objection to the question. The judge may disallow a 
question even though no objection is made. The judge shall preserve the 
written question in the court file. If the question is allowed, the judge shall ask 
the question or permit counsel or an unrepresented party to ask it. The 
question may be rephrased into proper form. The judge shall allow counsel 
and unrepresented parties to examine the witness after the juror's question. 
(j) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to view the place 
in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, or in which any other 
material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body under the 
charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by some person 
appointed by the court for that purpose. The officer shall be sworn that while 
the jury are thus conducted, he will suffer no person other than the person so 
appointed to speak to them nor to do so himself on any subject connected with 
the trial and to return them into court without unnecessary delay or at a 
specified time. 
(k) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are permitted to separate 
or are sequestered, they shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty 
not to converse among themselves or to converse with, or suffer themselves to 
be addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is their 
duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally 
submitted to them. 
(/) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the instruc-
tions of the court and all exhibits which have been received as evidence, except 
exhibits that should not, in the opinion of the court, be in the possession of the 
jury, such as exhibits of unusual size, weapons or contraband. The court shall 
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permit the jury to view exhibits upon request. Jurors are entitled to take notes 
during the trial and to have those notes with them during deliberations. As 
necessary, the court shall provide jurors with writing materials and instruct the 
jury on taking and using notes. 
(m) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall be kept together 
in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they agree upon a 
verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Except by 
order of the court, the officer having them under his charge shall not allow any 
communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except to ask them if 
they have agreed upon their verdict, and he shall not, before the verdict is 
rendered, communicate to any person the state of their deliberations or the 
verdict agreed upon. 
(n) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed on 
any point of law arising in the cause, they shall inform the officer in charge of 
them, who shall communicate such request to the court. The court may then 
direct that the jury be brought before the court where, in the presence of the 
defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry or advise the 
jury that no further instructions shall be given. Such response shall be 
recorded. The court may in its discretion respond to the inquiry in writing 
without having the jury brought before the court, in which case the inquiry and 
the response thereto shall be entered in the record. 
(o) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on its face, it may be 
corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may be sent out 
again. 
(p) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion 
of all the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any information or 
indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not 
legally sufficient to establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included 
offense. 
[Amended effective November 1, 2001; November 1, 2002.] 
Advisory Committee Note 
Paragraph (Z). The committee recom-
mends amending paragraph (/) to establish 
the right of jurors to take notes and to 
have those notes with them during deliber-
ations. The committee recommends re-
moving depositions from the paragraph 
not in order to permit the jurors to have 
depositions but to recognize that deposi-
tions are not evidence. Depositions read 
into evidence will be treated as any other 
oral testimony. These amendments and 
similar amendments to the Rules of Civil 
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State v. Allen 
Utah,2005. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Paul Christopher ALLEN, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20000531. 
Feb. 11,2005. 
Rehearing Denied Feb. 16, 2005. 
Background: Defendant was convicted in the Second 
District Court, Farmington County, GlenR. Dawson, J., 
of aggravated murder. Defendant appealed. 
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Durrant J., held that: 
(1) other crimes evidence showing that defendant had 
made fraudulent credit card purchases both preceding 
and following his murder of victim was offered for 
proper noncharacter purposes of establishing charged 
conspiracy offense and proving preparation, plan, 
intent, and knowledge; 
{2} other crimes evidence was relevant; 
(3) probative value of other crimes evidence 
substantially outweighed its prejudicial effect; 
(4) trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
defendant's request for mistrial following witness's 
improper statement during his testimony that defendant 
had been asked to take a lie detector test; 
(5) trial court did not abuse its discretion in by refusing 
to grant new trial after one of jurors improperly learned 
through her spouse that defense counsel had requested 
a mistrial after witness's testimony and shared such 
information with other jurors; and 
(6) trial court was not required to apply rebuttable 




HI Criminal Law 110 €=^1144.13(2.1) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
llOXXMNfl Presumptions 
U0kll44 Facts or Proceedings Not Shown by 
Record 
110kll44.13 Sufficiency of Evidence 
110k! 144.13(2) Construction of 
Evidence 
110kll44.13Q.n k. In General. 
Most Cited Cases 
Criminal Law 110 €^1144.13(5) 
110 Criminal Law 
11OXXIV Review 
110XXMM) Presumptions 
1 lQkl 144 Facts or Proceedings Not Shown by 
Record 
110kll44.13 Sufficiency of Evidence 
HOkl 144.13(5) k. Inferences or 
Deductions from Evidence. Most Cited Cases 
On appeal from a jury verdict, an appellate court views 
the evidence and all reasonable inferences in a light 
most favorable to that verdict and recites the facts 
accordingly. 
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110 Criminal Law 
11 OX VII Evidence 
HOXVIIfF) Other Offenses 
110k370 k. Acts Showing Knowledge. Most 
Cited Cases 
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Criminal Law 110 €=>371(4) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XVII Evidence 
110XVIKF) Other Offenses 
110k371 Acts Showing Intent or Malice or 
Motive 
110k371(4) k. In Prosecutions for 
Homicide. Most Cited Cases 
Criminal Law 110 €=^371(12) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XVII Evidence 
110XVIKF) Other Offenses 
110k371 Acts Showing Intent or Malice or 
Motive 
110k371(12) k. Motive. Most Cited Cases 
Criminal Law 110 €=>372(4) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XVII Evidence 
110XVIKF) Other Offenses 
110k372 Acts Part of Series Showing System 
or Habit 
110k372(4) k. Homicide. Most Cited Cases 
Other crimes evidence showing that defendant had 
made fraudulent credit card purchases both preceding 
and following his murder of victim, who was 
defendant's wife, was offered in prosecution for 
aggravated murder and conspiracy to commit 
aggravated murder for proper noncharacter purposes of 
establishing conspiracy offense and proving 
preparation, plan, intent, and knowledge; fraudulent 
purchases demonstrated means by which defendant 
sought to conceal his payments to individual who 
allegedly helped arrange for victim's murder, and 
fraudulent purchases demonstrated how defendant 
planned to account for his own discretionary spending 
and thereby disguise his payments to individual. Rules 
ofEvid., Rule 404(b). 
131 Criminal Law 110 €^>1153(1) 
110 Criminal Law 
11QXXIV Review 
Page 2 
110XXIV(N) Discretion of Lower Court 
110k! 153 Reception and Admissibility of 
Evidence; Witnesses 
110kll53(l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
When examining a trial court's decision to admit other 
crimes evidence, an appellate court reviews such 
decision for an abuse of discretion. Rules of Evid., 
Rule 404(b). 
HI Criminal Law 110 €==>1153(1) 
110 Criminal Lav/ 
110XXIV Review 
llOXXIVfN) Discretion of Lower Court 
110k! 153 Reception and Admissibility of 
Evidence; Witnesses 
HOkl 153(1) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
In reviewing a trial court's decision to admit other 
crimes evidence for an abuse of discretion, an appellate 
court reviews the record to determine whether the 
admission of other crimes evidence was scrupulously 
examined by the trial judge in the proper exercise of 
that discretion. Rules of Evid., Rule 404(b). 
151 Criminal Law 110 €==>369.2(1) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XVII Evidence 
110XVIKF) Other Offenses 
110k369 Other Offenses as Evidence of 
Offense Charged in General 
110k369.2 Evidence Relevant to Offense, 
Also Relating to Other Offenses in General 
110k369.2(l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
In determining whether other crimes evidence is 
admissible, a court must first make an initial 
determination as to whether other crimes evidence is 
being offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose. Rules 
of Evid.. Rule 404(b). 
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110XVIKF) Other Offenses 
110k369 Other Offenses as Evidence of 
Offense Charged in General 
110k369.2 Evidence Relevant to Offense, 
Also Relating to Other Offenses in General 
110k369.2(l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Other crimes evidence is not precluded so long as the 
evidence is offered for a legitimate purpose other than 
to show the defendant's propensity to commit the crime 
charged. Rules of Evid.. Rule 404(b). 
iH Criminal Law 110 €^369.2(4) 
110 Criminal Law 
11OXVII Evidence 
110XVIKF) Other Offenses 
U0k369 Other Offenses as Evidence of 
Offense Charged in General 
110k369.2 Evidence Relevant to Offense, 
Also Relating to Other Offenses in General 
110k369.2(3) Particular Offenses, 
Prosecutions for 
110k369.2(4) k. Assault, Homicide, 
Abortion and Kidnapping. Most Cited Cases 
In prosecution for aggravated murder and conspiracy to 
commit aggravated murder, other crimes evidence 
showing that defendant had made fraudulent credit card 
purchases both preceding and following his murder of 
victim, who was defendant's wife, was relevant to 
whether defendant had conspired to kill victim; 
evidence of how defendant concealed his payments to 
individual who allegedly helped arrange for victim's 
murder corroborated individual's account of the events 
and therefore ultimately supported the State's allegation 
that defendant had conspired with individual to murder 
victim. Rules ofEvid., Rules 401, 402, 404(b). 
[81 Criminal Law 110 €=^369.2(1) 
110 Criminal Law 
11 OXVII Evidence 
110XVIKF) Other Offenses 
110k369 Other Offenses as Evidence of 
Offense Charged in General 
110k369.2 Evidence Relevant to Offense, 
Also Relating to Other Offenses in General 
110k369.2(l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Even if other crimes evidence is offered for a proper, 
noncharacterpurpose, a court must also determine 
whether the evidence is relevant. Rules of Evid., Rules 
401. 402, 404(b). 
121 Criminal Law 110 €==>338(7) 
110 Criminal Law 
11 OXVII Evidence 
llOXVH(D) Facts in Issue and Relevance 
110k338 Relevancy in General 
110k338(7) k. Evidence Calculated to 
Create Prejudice Against or Sympathy for Accused. 
Most Cited Cases 
Criminal Law 110 €=>369.2(4) 
110 Criminal Law 
11 OXVII Evidence 
110XVIKF) Other Offenses 
110k369 Other Offenses as Evidence of 
Offense Charged in General 
110k369.2 Evidence Relevant to Offense, 
Also Relating to Other Offenses in General 
110k369.2(3) Particular Offenses, 
Prosecutions for 
110k369.2(4) k. Assault, Homicide, 
Abortion and Kidnapping. Most Cited Cases 
Probative value of other crimes evidence showing that 
defendant had made fraudulent credit card purchases 
both preceding and following his murder of victim, who 
was defendant's wife, sufficiently outweighed danger of 
unfair prejudice to be admissible in prosecution for 
aggravated murder and conspiracy to commit 
aggravated murder; need for the evidence was 
significant, as fraudulent purchases were direct 
evidence of defendant's participation in the conspiracy 
and corroborated the testimony of witness that 
defendant had paid individual to arrange for victim's 
murder, evidence of fraudulent purchases was strong, 
and it was unlikely that defendant's involvement in 
fraudulent activities would have roused the jury to 
overmastering hostility, especially in light of the gravity 
of the offenses for which he was charged. Rules of 
Evid.. Rules 403. 404(b). 
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UOl Criminal Law 110 €==>338(7) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XVII Evidence 
llOXVH(D) Facts in Issue and Relevance 
110k338 Relevancy in General 
110k338(7) k. Evidence Calculated to 
Create Prejudice Against or Sympathy for Accused. 
Most Cited Cases 
Criminal Law 110 €==>369.1 
110 Criminal Law 
11 OX VII Evidence 
110XVIKF) Other Offenses 
110k369 Other Offenses as Evidence of 
Offense Charged in General 
110k369.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Criminal Law 110 €=>675 
110 Criminal Law 
110XX Trial 
HOXX(C) Reception of Evidence 
110k675 k. Cumulative Evidence in General. 
Most Cited Cases 
Even if other crimes evidence is offered for a proper, 
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learned through her spouse that defense counsel had 
requested a mistrial after witness's testimony and shared 
such information with other jurors; while State's witness 
and defense counsel were directly involved in events 
that ultimately caused press to report on defendant's 
motion for mistrial, only unauthorized "contact" that 
occurred was between juror and spouse. 
*732 Mark L. Shurtleff Att'y Gen., Kenneth A. 
Bronston, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, and William 
K. McGuire, Farmington, for plaintiff. 
ToddA.Utzinger, Scott L.Wiggins, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant. 
DURRANT, Justice: 
^ 1 Defendant Paul Christopher Allen appeals his 
conviction for aggravated murder. He argues that 
numerous prejudicial errors occurred during the course 
of his trial and requests that this court reverse his 
conviction. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
HI If 2 "On appeal from a jury verdict, we view the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences in a light most 
favorable to that verdict and recite the facts 
accordingly." State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350, 351 
(Utah 1996). 
K 3 On the evening of August 28, 1996, police were 
called to Allen's North Salt Lake City apartment, where 
they discovered Allen and the lifeless body of Allen's 
wife, Jill, lying on the hallway floor. Blood spatter 
covered the walls near Jill's body, and the carpet 
beneath her was soaked with blood. Jill's belt was 
broken and her clothing was pushed back, exposing her 
body from neck to ankles. The contents of her purse 
had been dumped out and scattered across the kitchen 
counter. A baseball bat lay in the doorway of a nearby 
bedroom. 
If 4 Although the evidence at the scene indicated that 
there had been a struggle, there was no sign of forced 
entry through any of the apartment's doors or windows. 
A forensic pathologist later certified Jill's cause of 
death as the result of strangulation and blunt force 
trauma to the head. Despite indications that would 
suggest otherwise, the pathologist determined that there 
was no evidence of sexual assault. 
% 5 Sergeant John Herndon, the lead investigator on the 
case, pursued several leads in the months following 
Jill's murder without success before Brandon Nicholsen 
came forward with information about the homicide. 
Nicholsen informed Sergeant Herndon that he, 
Nicholsen, had helped a coworker, George Anthony 
Taylor, dispose of evidence *733 related to the murder 
of a woman in North Salt Lake. 
f 6 In exchange for immunity for hispart in the crime, 
Nicholsen recounted that three weeks before Jill's 
murder, Taylor had told him that he, Taylor, and 
another man, Joseph Wright, had b een hired by a 
"Paul" to kill Paul's wife, and that Taylor would receive 
between $5,000 and $10,000 for his part in the murder. 
When Nicholsen confronted Taylor about his 
involvement after hearing a television report about Jill's 
murder, Taylor admitted to the killing. Taylor told 
Nicholsen that he entered Jill's home with a key 
provided by Allen. When the gun he had intended to 
shoot her with misfired, Taylor explained that he struck 
Jill in the head first with the gun and later with a 
baseball bat before he finally strangled her to death. 
Taylor later admitted that he had emptied the contents 
of Jill's purse and staged her body to make it look like 
a robbery and a sexual assault. 
If 7 Following Nicholsen's disclosures, police arrested 
Taylor for Jill's murder. When Taylor confessed to his 
part in the murder and implicated Wright, police also 
arrested Wright. 
^ 8 Wright confessed to police that Allen had first 
approached him near the end of 1995 and indicated that 
he, Allen, knew someone at his work who wanted "a 
guy" killed for $ 10,000. When Allen asked if Wright 
was interested, Wright told Allen that he would "see 
what [he] could do." Sometime later, Allen told 
Wright specifically that he was having problems in his 
marriage and that he wanted his wife, Jill, killed. Allen 
stated that he would pay Wright $30,000 out of Jill's 
$50,000 life insurance policy for the murder. Wright 
agreed to the proposal, and the two thereafter discussed 
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various methods of committing the murder and finding 
someone to do the job. In April 1996, Taylor agreed 
to murder Jill. 
% 9 Wright testified that, to facilitate the murder, Allen 
paid Wright in cash at various times before and after the 
killing in an amount totaling between $14,000 and 
$ 16,000. Wright stated that Allen promised to pay the 
balance owingto Wright when Allen's negotiations with 
the insurance company were resolved. 
1f 10 Following the police investigation, the State 
charged Allen with aggravated murder, conspiracy to 
commit aggravated murder, and criminal solicitation in 
connection with Jill's murder.— A jury found Allen 
guilty of aggravated murder at the conclusion of Allen's 
trial, and Allen was sentenced to life with the possibility 
of parole. 
FN1. The State also charged Allen with filing 
a false or fraudulent insurance claim, which 
was later dismissed. 
Tf 11 On appeal, Allen identifies numerous errors that he 
alleges occurred during his trial. Specifically, he raises 
six issues that, according to Allen, warrant reversal of 
his conviction. Because several of these issues are 
inadequately briefed, however, we address only whether 
the district court abused its discretion in (1) allowing 
the State to introduce evidence under Utah Rule of 
Evidence 404(b) that Allen had made fraudulent credit 
card purchases, (2) refusing to grant a mistrial after 
Wright testified that Allen had been asked by the police 
to take a lie detector test, and (3) refusing to grant a 
new trial based on juror misconduct.— We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 7 8-2-2(3 )(i) 
(2002). 
FN2. Because they are inadequately briefed, 
we do not address the remaining issues raised 
by Allen on appeal relating to (1) the district 
court's refusal to grant a mistrial after a 
witness testified that Allen had retained an 
attorney prior to his arrest, (2) the district 
court's reasonable doubt jury instruction, and 
(3) cumulative error. See, e.g., Smith v. Four 
Corners Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 2003 UT 
23,1146, 70P.3d904 (declining to address an 
inadequately briefed argument). 
ANALYSIS 
I. UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 404(b) 
£2J Tf 12 We first examine Allen's contention that the 
district court abused its discretion under Utah Rule of 
Evidence 404(b) when it admitted evidence showing 
that Allen had made fraudulent credit card purchases 
both preceding and following his wife's murder. 
*734 If 13 During Allen's trial, the State was allowed to 
introduce evidence that, while employed as an AT & T 
sales representative, Allenmisappropriated confidential 
credit information from at least two of his clients and 
used this information to fraudulently obtain credit cards 
and purchase several personal items from various 
retailers, including JC Penney, Pro Golf, Uintah Golf, 
and the Bombay Company.— Wright also testified that 
Allen had told him that he, Allen, was using stolen 
credit cards from his AT & T clients to make purchases 
at several different locations in order to account for the 
discretionary income he was using to pay Wright. 
FN3. Specifically, the State introduced various 
fraudulent applications for store credit and 
receipts evidencing Allen's fraudulent 
purchases, which included, among others 
items, golf clubs and various golf accessories, 
a king-size bed, and several hundred dollars 
worth of bedding. The State also introduced 
phone records showing that Allen had used his 
cellular phone to place calls to the Bombay 
Company where one of the fraudulent 
purchases was made. 
f 14 Allen argues that the district court abused its 
discretion under Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) when it 
permitted the State to introduce evidence of Allen's 
fraudulent purchases. The State counters that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion for two 
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reasons. First, it asserts that the evidence of Allen's 
fraudulent purchases does not implicate rule 404(b) 
since it was introduced not as evidence of "other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts," Utah R. Evid. 404(b) 
(emphasis added), but as an act committed directly in 
furtherance of the charged conspiracy. In support of 
this assertion, the State cites several federal cases in 
which courts have concluded that rule 404(b) of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence applies only "to evidence of 
acts extrinsic to the crime charged." United States v. 
Green, 175 F.3d 822, 831 (10th Cir.1999) (internal 
quotations omitted); accord, e.g., United States v. 
Alexander, 331 F.3d 116, 125 (D.C.Cir.2003) ("Rule 
404(b) applies only to 'extrinsic' evidence of other 
crimes and not to 'intrinsic' evidence of the same 
crime."); United States v. Abrezo, 141 F.3d 142, 175 
(5th Cir. 1998) ("[E] vidence of acts committed pursuant 
to a conspiracy and offered to prove the defendant's 
membership or participation in the conspiracy are not 
extrinsic evidence, i.e., evidence of 'other' acts, for 
purposes of Rule 404(b)." (internal quotations 
omitted)). Alternatively, the State argues that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion because the 
evidence of Allen's fraudulent purchases satisfies the 
requirements of Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b). 
f3ir41 \ 15 We need not consider whether the evidence 
of Allen's fraudulent purchases was admissible as 
"intrinsic evidence" under a federal analysis because we 
conclude that it was admissible under a traditional Utah 
Rule of Evidence 404(b) analysis. When examining a 
district court's decision to admit evidence under Utah 
Rule of Evidence 404(b), we review for an abuse of 
discretion. State v. Nelson-Wagoner, 2000 UT 59, \ 
16, 6 P.3d 1120. In so doing, "[w]e review the record 
to determine whether the admission of other bad acts 
evidence was scrupulously examined by the [district] 
judge in the proper exercise of that discretion." Id. 
(internal quotations omitted). 
1 16 Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b)provides that 
[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to 
show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, 
be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident... 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b). We have held that rule 404(b) 
allows for the introduction of bad acts evidence if the 
evidence satisfies the following three criteria: (1) the 
evidence is offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose, 
such as one of those listed in rule 404(b): (2) the 
evidence meets the requirements of rule 402: and (3) 
the evidence meets the requirements of rule 403. 
Nelson-Wagoner, 2000 UT 59 at HTf 18-20, 6 P.3d 
1120 (citing State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, Iff 21-22, 
29, 993 P.2d 837). We examine each of these criteria 
in turn. 
A. Proper, Noncharacter Purpose 
\51\6\ If 17 Under the first part of a rule 404(b) analysis, 
a court must make an initial determination as to whether 
the bad acts *735 evidence is being offered for a 
proper, noncharacter purpose. Id. atf 18. Rule 404(b) 
lists several purposes for which evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts maybe admitted, "such as proof 
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b). This list is not exhaustive, 
however, and evidence demonstrating other purposes is 
not precluded so long as the evidence is offered for a 
legitimate purpose other than to show the defendant's 
propensity to commit the crime charged. See State v. 
Houskeever, 2002 UT 118, 1111 27-28, 62 P.3d 444: 
State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67,Iff! 26-27, 52 P.3d 
1194. 
1f 18 Here, the district court found that if the evidence 
of Allen's fraudulent purchases came in as the State 
anticipated, "the evidence would be relevant for an 
appropriate purpose and non-character purpose; that is, 
intent, preparation, plan and knowledge." The court 
also reasoned that the fraudulent purchases were proper, 
noncharacter evidence of the conspiracy with which 
Allen was charged. We reject Allen's assertion that the 
district court abused its discretion in concluding that the 
fraudulent purchase evidence was admissible for these 
proper and noncharacter purposes. 
K 19 First, it is evident that the State introduced the 
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fraudulent purchases not to show that Allen had a 
propensity to commit crime, but rather, to establish that 
Allen had engaged in a conspiracy to murder his wife 
and that he had employed Wright as a middleman in 
order to facilitate this action. The fraudulent purchases 
were direct evidence of acts Allen committed in 
furtherance of the conspiracy and demonstrated the 
means by which Allen sought to conceal his payments 
to Wright.^ 
FN4. Allen repeatedly argues that the State 
has failed to establish "any connection" 
between Allen's fraudulent purchases and his 
conspiracy to murder Jill. This is incorrect. 
Wright clearly testified during trial that Allen 
had represented to Wright that he, Allen, was 
using his clients' stolen information to make 
fraudulent purchases from various stores in 
order to account for the money he was paying 
to Wright. Wright's testimony therefore 
directly linked Allen's fraudulent purchases to 
the conspiracy. 
If 20 Additionally, the evidence regarding Allen's 
fraudulent transfers was also admitted for the proper, 
noncharacter purposes of proving preparation, plan, 
intent, and knowledge. This evidence demonstrated 
how Allen planned to account for his own discretionary 
spending and thereby disguise his payments to Wright. 
It also was connected with the advance payments Allen 
made to Wright in preparation for the murder, and 
illustrated that Allen knowingly engaged in the 
conspiracy with the intent to murder his wife. 
f 21 Because the State introduced evidence of Allen's 
fraudulent purchases for these legitimate reasons and 
not simply to show that Allen had a propensity to 
commit crime, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in concluding that the State's evidence was 
introduced for a proper, noncharacter purpose under 
rule 404(b). 
B. Relevance Under Ride 402 
[7] f 22 Even if evidence is offered for a proper, 
noncharacter purpose, a court must also determine 
whether the evidence is relevant under Utah Rule of 
Evidence 402. Nelson-Wazsoner, 2000 UT 59 at If 19, 
6 P.3d 1120. Relevant evidence is defined as 
"evidence having any tendency to make the existence of 
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of 
the action more probable or less probable than it would 
be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401. 
£81 Tf 23 Here, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in determining that the evidence of Allen's 
fraudulent purchases was relevant to the question of 
whether Allen had conspired to kill his wife. As the 
district court accurately observed, the evidence of how 
Allen concealed his payments to Wright corroborated 
Wright's account of the events and therefore ultimately 
supported the State's allegation that Allen had conspired 
with Taylor and Wright to murder his wife. The 
evidence of Allen's fraudulent purchases made the 
existence of a conspiracy and the actions taken in 
furtherance thereof more probable than if the evidence 
were not admitted. 
*736 C. Probative Value Versus Prejudicial Effect 
Under Rule 403 
r9iri01 If 24 Finally, even if evidence is offered for a 
proper, noncharacter purpose and is relevant, a district 
court must determine whether the probative value of the 
evidence " ' is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading 
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.' 
" Nelson-Wazzoner, 2000 UT 59 at f 20, 6 P.3d 1120 
(quoting Utah R. Evid. 403). In considering whether 
to exclude otherwise admissible evidence under rule 
403, we have stated that a district court should evaluate 
several factors, including 
the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the 
other crime, the similarities between the crimes, the 
interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the 
need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, 
and the degree to which the evidence probably will 
rouse the jury to overmastering hostility. 
Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at If 29, 993 P.2d 837 (quoting 
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State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291. 295-96 (Utah 1988) 
(further citation omitted)). We hereinafter refer to 
these factors as the "Shickles factors." 
\ 25 Allen argues that the district court abused its 
discretion in allowing evidence of the fraudulent 
purchases to be admitted because, according to Allen, 
the record lacks "any indication" that the district court 
gave "any real consideration of the matters to be 
considered in the course of performing" the requisite 
balancing required by rule 403 . He argues that, 
without evidence that the district court examined and 
considered the various Shickles factors described 
above, we must conclude that the district court erred in 
allowing the State to introduce evidence of Allen's 
fraudulent purchases. We disagree. 
f 26 A review of the record demonstrates that the 
district court carefully balanced the probative value of 
the evidence against its prejudicial effect. Although 
the court acknowledged that the fraudulent purchase 
evidence would connect Allen with an uncharged 
wrong, it reasoned that such connection did not render 
the evidence inadmissible. The court explained that 
the probative value of the fraudulent purchases as direct 
evidence of Allen's participation in a conspiracy to 
commit murder was significant and relevant to showing 
Allen's preparation, plan, knowledge, and intent. 
Moreover, the court did not find the evidence to be 
particularly inflammatory or egregious. 
% 27 The record also reveals that the district court 
sought to minimize any confusion that introduction of 
the fraudulent purchase evidence may have caused by 
instructing the jury that the evidence was "not to be 
considered... to prove that [Allen was] a person of bad 
character or that he ha[d] a disposition to commit 
crimes," but rather "only for the limited purpose of 
determining if it tend[ed] to show: proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, or 
absence of mistake." Additionally, the introduction of 
the evidence did not cause unnecessary delay, since the 
State introduced the majority of its evidence relating to 
Allen's fraudulent credit card applications and 
purchases through stipulated exhibits, and all other 
references made of Allen's fraudulent activities were 
relatively brief. 
If 28 We acknowledge that, in reaching its conclusion 
that the probative value of the fraudulent purchase 
evidence was not substantially outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect, the district court did not explicitly 
identify the Shickles factors referenced in Decorso. 
However, it is evident that the district court relied 
extensively on Decorso in making all three inquiries 
required by rule 404(b). Moreover, we can find no 
relevant Shickles factor that would lead us to believe 
the district court abused its discretion in allowing the 
State to introduce the fraudulent purchase evidence. 
f 29 First, the need for the evidence was significant. 
The fraudulent purchases were direct evidence of 
Allen's participation in the conspiracy and corroborated 
the testimony of Wright, a key witness for the State, that 
Allen had paid Wrright to arrange for Jill's murder. 
U 30 Second, the evidence that Allen had, in fact, stolen 
personal client information and used it to make 
fraudulent purchases was *737 strong. Police were 
alerted to Allen's fraudulent activities only after Wright 
indicated that Allen was disguising the payments used 
to facilitate Jill's murder by using stolen credit cards to 
purchase personal property from the Bombay Company, 
JC Penney, Uintah Golf, and Pro Golf. Police 
confirmed the veracity of this account after an 
investigation revealed that someone had fraudulently 
used the credit of two of Allen's clients at these specific 
stores to purchase various items in the period leading 
up to and following Jill's death. Moreover, Allen made 
no attempt to refute this testimony and explicitly 
stipulated to the introduction of evidence establishing 
his fraudulent activities during trial. 
Tf 31 Third, the fraudulent purchases were made 
contemporaneously with the conspiracy. Although the 
purchases do not correspond exactly with the payments 
Allen made to Wright for Jill's murder,—the fraudulent 
purchases, like the payments to Wright, occurred 
leading up to and following the murder. 
FN5. Allen argues that because the cash 
payments and dates on which they were made 
to Wright do not directly correspond "line by 
line" to the dates upon and the amounts in 
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which the fraudulent purchases were made, the 
purchases provide no proof of Allen's role in 
the conspiracy to commit the murder. We 
disagree. The State did not need to establish 
such an exacting correlat ion for a jury to 
reasonably conclude that the fraudulent 
purchases made before and after Jill's death 
were connected to the payments Allen made to 
Wright. 
^ 32 Fourth, evidence of the fraudulent purchases was 
needed to demonstrate that the money Wright received 
for his participation in the conspiracy came from Allen, 
not another source. It would have been difficult for the 
State to have corroborated Wright's testimony and 
established this link as effectively through alternative 
methods of proof. 
Tf 33 Finally, it is unlikely that Allen's involvement in 
fraudulent activities would have roused the jury to 
overmasteringhostility, especially in light of the gravity 
of the offenses for which he was charged. Contrary to 
Allen's assertions, we do not believe a juror who had 
reasonable doubt of Allen's participation in Jill's murder 
would nevertheless have been more likely to convict 
Allen on such a weighty charge simply because he or 
she desired to punish him for his prior, relatively minor 
fraudulent acts. 
134 In sum, because the evidence of Allen's fraudulent 
purchases was admitted for a proper, noncharacter 
purpose, was relevant, and had probative value that was 
not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect, 
the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing 
the State to introduce the evidence during Allen's trial. 
II. WRIGHT'S REFERENCE TO A LIE 
DETECTOR TEST 
ri l l 1f 35 We next address Allen's contention that the 
district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a 
mistrial after Wright made an improper comment during 
the course of his testimony. 
Tf 36 During the State's examination of Wright, the 
following exchange took place: 
Q. What, if anything, did you and Paul discuss about 
the nature of your telephone conversation after Jill's 
death? 
A. We just made it seem-we talked about what the 
investigators were coming out to talk to me about, 
things like that. Paul would reassure me that these 
things were happening to all of his friends and don't 
worry about it. You don't got nothing to worry about, 
you haven't done anything. They're going to continue 
to do this. Things like that. He had told me that they 
had asked him to come in for a lie detector test. 
(Emphasis added.) Allen allowed the State's 
examination to continue briefly followingthis statement 
before requesting a bench conference and asking the 
court for an opportunity to request a mistrial. Upon 
conclusion of the State's direc t examination, Allen 
moved for a mistrial, arguing that the State had 
inappropriately and prejudicially elicited the lie 
detector reference from Wright. 
1f 37 The district court denied Allen's motion. Given 
the context in which it was made, the court did not find 
the lie detector reference to have been intentionally 
elicited or planned. Because Wright made the 
statement*738 in passing and neither party attracted 
attention to it, the court concluded that the statement 
was "simply innocuous" and would not prejudice the 
jury. The court did offer to give a curative instruction 
regarding the comment, however, which Allen declined. 
If 38 On appeal, Allen argues that Wright's reference to 
a lie detector test "most likely caused the jury to 
speculate about why the results of [Allen's] polygraph 
examination were not placed into evidence or discussed 
at trial," and that "[s]uch speculation logically led the 
jury to conclude that he was trying to hide the negative 
results of the lie detector test." He argues that this 
reference prejudiced his right to a fair trial, and that as 
a result the district court abused its discretion when it 
denied Allen's request for a mistrial.— We disagree. 
FN6. Allen also suggests that Wright's 
statement was exacerbated by prosecutorial 
misconduct. He asserts that the prosecutor 
was aware of Wright's potential testimony but 
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nevertheless improperly allowed Wright to 
make reference to the lie detector test, "which, 
in turn, allowed the jury to abdicate its 
all-important and difficult truth finding 
function." Because Allen has failed to 
provide relevant authority supporting his 
assertion that conduct such as this constitutes 
prosecutorial misconduct warranting a new 
trial, we decline to address the issue. See 
Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr., 
Inc.. 2003 UT 23, 1f 46, 70 P.3d 904 
(declining to address an inadequately briefed 
argument). 
["121 If 39 Because a district judge is in an advantaged 
position to determine the impact of courtroom events on 
the total proceedings, once a district court has exercised 
its discretion and denied a motion for a mistrial, we will 
not reverse the court's decision unless it "is plainly 
wrong in that the incident so likely influenced the jury 
that the defendant cannot be said to have had a fair 
trial." State v. Wach 2001 UT 35,1145. 24 P.3d 948. 
Applying this standard in this case, we cannot conclude 
that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to 
grant a mistrial. 
T131 \ 40 A review of our case law amply reveals that 
a mistrial is not required where an improper statement 
is not intentionally elicited, is made in passing, and is 
relatively innocuous in light of all the testimony 
presented. For example, in State v. Butter field, 2001 
UT59. 27P.3d 1133, we held that a district court did 
not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial 
after a witness testified that he had obtained the 
defendant's photograph from the Salt Lake County Jail. 
Id. at % 47. We explained that the statement was not 
intentionally elicited, was "vague" and "fleeting," and 
the defendant could not point to evidence in the record 
suggesting that the jury had relied on the witness's 
statement. Id 
1f 41 Similarly, in Wach, we held that a district court did 
not abuse its discretion where it declined to grant a 
mistrial after a witness violated the parties' previous 
stipulation by introducing evidence of the defendant's 
prior bad acts. 2001 UT 35 at HIT44-46. 24 P.3d 948. 
We reasoned that the statement was "not elicited by the 
prosecutor," was an "isolated, off-hand remark, buried 
in roughly 244 pages of testimony," and was "not 
necessarily inflammatory." Id. at If 46. 
K 42 Finally, in State v. Decor so. 1999 UT 57.993 P.2d 
837, we concluded that a district court's refusal to grant 
a mistrial after a witness made improper references to 
other crimes the defendant had committed was not an 
abuse of discretion. Id. at \ 38. We explained that the 
reference to other crimes was "vague" and "came only 
after a lengthy direct examination and lengthy 
cross-examination," and that the proceedings "move[d] 
along without undue interruption and directed the jury's 
attention to other matters." Id. at \ 39; see also State 
v. Griffiths. 752 P.2d 879. 881, 883 (Utah 1988) 
(holding a district court did not commit reversible error 
by allowing a witness to improperly state that the 
defendant possessed an outstanding warrant on another 
offense because the statement was unintentionally 
elicited, was "very brief and "only made in passing," 
provided no details of why the warrant was issued or to 
which offense it was related, and the district court 
admonished the jury to disregard the statement); State 
v. Case, 547 P.2d 221, 223 (Utah 1976) (holding the 
district court properly denied a defendant's motion for 
a mistrial after a witness stated that the defendant had 
been incarcerated in the Utah State Prison where the 
statement was inadvertent, *739 not intentionally 
elicited, and neither counsel nor court made further 
reference to it). 
\ 43 Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in declining to grant a mistrial for many of the reasons 
articulated in the cases described above. First, 
Wright's reference to a lie detector test was not 
intentionally elicited or planned. Second, the reference 
was vague and mentioned only that Allen had been 
asked to take a lie detector test-not that Allen had 
actually taken or failed to pass such a test. Third, the 
reference was brief and came only near the end of a 
three-hour direct examination. Fourth, the proceedings 
continued without undue interruption. Fifth, no further 
attention was directed to either a lie detector test or 
Wright's statement. Finally, the district court offered 
to give the jury a curative instruction regarding the lie 
detector reference, which Allen declined. 
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If 44 Because we agree with the district court that 
Wright's statement was innocuous, we conclude that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to 
grant Allen's motion for a mistrial. 
III. JUROR MISCONDUCT 
f!41 K 45 We turn now to the final issue Allen raises on 
appeal; namely, whether the district court abused its 
discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial based on juror 
misconduct. 
1f 46 During the State's direct examination of Camille 
Mauerhan, a State's witness, Mauerhan testified that 
Allen had mentioned to her in a conversation prior to 
his arrest that the police refused to speak with him 
because he had retained an attorney. At the conclusion 
of this testimony and in open court outside of the 
presence of the jury, Allen moved for a mistrial, 
arguing that Mauerhan's statement that Allen had 
retained an attorney was prejudicial because it implied 
that Allen was guilty and had something to hide. 
Although the court ordered that the statement be 
stricken from the record as unresponsive and directed 
the jury to disregard it as such, the court declined to 
grant the mistrial. 
^ 47 After the jury returned a guilty verdict and Allen 
was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole, 
Allen filed a motion for a new trial, alleging juror 
misconduct. Allen argued that one of the jurors had 
learned through her spouse that defense counsel had 
requested a mistrial based on Mauerhan's testimony, 
and that the juror had subsequently relayed that 
information to the other jurors. 
K 48 In its ruling on Allen's motion, the district court 
observed that "[i]t was inappropriate for any juror to 
have found out about the motion for a mistrial and also 
for any juror to have mentioned this to other members 
of the jury." However, the court also found that 
another juror had instructed the jury that they could not 
discuss the issue of a mistrial and that the jury did not, 
in fact, engage in any discussion regarding the mistrial 
motion. Based on these facts, the court concluded that 
Allen was not prejudiced because there was no 
reasonable likelihood of a different verdict absent the 
"somewhat innocuous" conduct of the juror. 
Consequently, the district court denied Allen's motion 
for a new trial. 
If 49 Allen argues that the district court abused its 
discretion when it declined to grant his motion for a 
new trial. He contends that, instead of examining 
whether he was prejudiced by the juror misconduct, the 
district court should have applied the rebuttable 
presumption of prejudice standard articulated by this 
court in State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 280 (Utah 1985). 
We disagree. 
ri5iri61T[ 50 "When reviewing a [district] court's 
denial of a motion for a new trial, we will not reverse 
absent a clear abuse of discretion by the [district] 
court." State v. Colwell 2000 UT 8. K 12, 994 P.2d 
177 (internal quotations omitted). "At the same time, 
however, we review the legal standards applied by the 
[district] court in denying the motion for correctness." 
State v. Martin. 2002 UT 34, If 45. 44 P.3d 805. 
[171T18] f 51 Allen correctly observes that when "any 
unauthorized contact during a trial between witnesses, 
attorneys or court personnel and jurors... goes beyond 
a mere incidental, unintended, and brief contact," there 
is a rebuttable presumption of prejudice, and that to 
counteract this presumption* 740 the prosecution must 
prove that the unauthorized contact did not influence 
the juror. Pike, 712 P.2d at 280 (emphasis added). 
However, the State also correctly notes that this 
rebuttable presumption only applies when the contact is 
between a juror and other court participants, not jurors 
and third parties unrelated to the proceedings. 
Compare id. at 279-80 (applying a rebuttable 
presumption of prejudice where the contact was 
between a juror and a witness); State v. Erickson, 749 
P.2d 620, 620-21 (Utah 1987) (same); State v. 
Anderson. 65 Utah 415, 237 P. 941, 942-44 (1925) 
(same); Lozan City v. Carlsen, 799 P.2d 224, 225-26 
(Utah Ct.App. 1990) (applying a rebuttable presumption 
of prejudice where the contact was between a juror and 
the court bailiff), with Arellano v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 5 
Utah 2d 146, 298 P.2d 527, 529-30 (1956) (explaining 
that jurors are presumed to have conducted themselves 
properly throughout the trial and illustrating that when 
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an alleged contact occurs between a juror and a 
non-court participant, the defendant must prove that the 
misconduct prejudiced the defendant); State v. Tennev. 
913P.2d750.756-58fUtahCt.App.1996) (holding that 
no rebuttable presumption of prejudice attached where 
a juror briefly discussed the case with a coworker 
because "there was no impermissible contact between 
a juror and a witness, party, or court personneP'-only 
contact "between a juror and an outsider under 
circumstances unrelated to the proceedings"); see also 
State v. Cardall 1999 UT 51. IT 12. 21. 982 P.2d 79 
(explaining that no presumption of prejudice arose 
where a young witness and her mother embraced on the 
witness stand at the conclusion of the witness's 
testimony because no conversation occurred between 
the witness and the jurors). 
fl91 \ 52 In his reply brief, Allen concedes that the Pike 
rebuttable presumption standard applies only when the 
contact involves a juror and a court participant. 
However, he argues that the contact in this case was, for 
all intents and purposes, between a juror and other court 
participants-namely, the juror who obtained the outside 
information, Allen's defense counsel, and Mauerhan, 
the State's witness. He asserts that, "[although press 
reports and spouses were the mediums through which 
the information traveled, the contact substantially 
amounted to improper contact between the juror, a 
witness, and counsel." This argument is without merit. 
\ 53 Mauerhan and Allen's defense counsel were 
obviously directly involved in the events that ultimately 
caused the press to report on Allen's request for a 
mistrial. However, it is clear that the only 
unauthorized "contact" that occurred in this case was 
between a juror and her spouse. Because the 
misconduct did not involve contact between a juror and 
court personnel, the district court applied the correct 
legal standard. Therefore, we need only determine 
whether the court abused its discretion in denying 
Allen's motion for a new trial. 
\ 54 We conclude that the district court did not abuse 
its discretion. The juror's comment was apparently 
brief and contained no substantive information 
concerning the mistrial motion. Additionally, the jury 
did not, in fact, discuss Allen's motion for a mistrial. 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in 
concluding that, under these circumstances, Allen was 
not prejudiced by the inappropriate juror contact. 
CONCLUSION 
\ 55 We reject Allen's assertion that any error occurred 
during the course of his trial that warrants a reversal of 
his conviction. First, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion under Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) by 
allowing the State to introduce evidence showing that 
Allen had used stolen client information to fraudulently 
obtain credit and purchase various items of personal 
property both before and after Jill's murder. Because 
the evidence was direct evidence of the conspiracy and 
illustrated Allen's preparation, plan, knowledge, and 
intent, it was admitted for a proper, noncharacter 
purpose. Additionally, the evidence was relevant, and 
the court acted within its discretion in concluding that 
the probative value of the evidence was not 
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 
Tf 56 Second, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial after Wright 
testified that Allen had *741 been asked to take a lie 
detector test. The improper reference was not 
intentionally elicited or planned, was vague in its 
substance, and came only near the end of a lengthy 
direct examination. Moreover, following the reference, 
the proceedings continued without undue interruption, 
no further attention was directed to either a lie detector 
test or Wright's statement, and the court offered to give 
a curative instruction to the jury, which Allen declined. 
Tf 57 Finally, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to grant a new trial after 
discovering that a juror had improperly learned through 
her spouse about a defense mistrial motion. Because 
the unauthorized contact was between a juror and a 
person unconnected to the proceedings, the district 
court correctly evaluated Allen's new trial motion in 
terms of whether Allen had been prejudiced by the 
misconduct. Further, because the improperly obtained 
information contained nothing substantive about the 
mistrial motion and the jury did not consider the 
information when making its decision, the district court 
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acted within its discretion in determining that a new 
trial was not warranted. Affirmed. 
f 58 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief Justice 
WILKINS. Justice PARRISH. and Justice NEHRING 
concur in Justice DURRANT's opinion. 
Utah,2005. 
State v. Allen 
108 P.3d 730, 519 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2005 UT 11 
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© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Addendum 3 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OP DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL CHRISTOPHER ALLEN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
ORDER REQUIRING RESPONSIVE 
PLEADING FROM THE STATE OF 
UTAH 
Case No. 050801275 
Judge Glen R. Dawson 
On October 18, 2005, Petitioner in the above-entitled case 
filed a Petition for Relief Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act 
and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Although 
Petitioner raises five numbered claims, the court's review of the 
petition suggests that several unnumbered claims have also been 
raised. For the sake of clarity, the court has renumbered all of 
the claims raised in the petition as follows: 
Claim 1: Judicial bias; 
Claim 2: Prosecution's use of false testimony during trial; 
Claim 3: Jurors were not fair and impartial; 
Claim 4: Trial court's refusal to give Petitioner's proffered 
jury instructions; 
Claim 5: Erroneous jury instructions and special verdict form; 
Claim 6: Error in trying Petitioner for multiple offenses; 
Claim 7: The Utah Supreme Court's decision on Petitioner's 
direct appeal was result-driven and erroneous; 
Claim 8: Error by the trial court resulting in a trial that 
I I I ! i l l !3 iU™ S«??J?,?±LVe P ^ i n g from the State ol 
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VD18728595 
was fundamentally unfair; 
Claim 9: Error by the trial court in denying Petitioner's 
motion for a new trial; 
Claim 10: Ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and 
Claim 11: Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
Pursuant to Rule 65C(g) (1) , the court has reviewed the 
petition and all attached documents. Based upon this initial 
review, the court has found that claim 7 is frivolous on its face 
because Petitioner is not entitled to the relief he seeks as a 
matter of law. See Utah Code Ann. 78-3-4(5) (district court only 
has appellate jurisdiction to review judgments from justice courts 
and small claims). Furthermore, the court has also found that 
claim 9 has been previously adjudicated. See State v. Allen, 2005 
UT 11, 149, 108 P. 3d 730 (trial court did not cibuse its discretion 
in denying motion for new trial). In light of these findings, the 
court has ordered the summary dismissal of claim 7 and claim 9. 
All proceedings on these two claims have, therefore, been 
terminated. Petitioner, however, is permitted to proceed on claims 
1-6, 8, and 10-11. 
Pursuant to Rule 65C(h), the court has directed the clerk of 
the court to mail a copy of the petition, attachments, and 
memorandum to Respondent. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent answer or otherwise 
respond to claims 1-6, 8, and 10-11 raised in the petition within 
2 
thirty (30) days from the date of this Order. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
65C(i) . 
DATED this "1 day of November, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
M^^mBti 
Judge Glen R. DaWJbn^^V-J \ 
Second Judicial District-Court 




IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL C. ALLEN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
CLINT FRIEL, STATE OF UTAH, et al. 
Respondent. 
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
Case No. 050801275 
Judge Glen R. Dawson 
On January 24, 2007, the Court heard arguments on all pending motions, including 
the State's motion to dismiss the petition for post-conviction relief and petitioner's 
motion for judgment on the pleadings. Assistant Utah Attorney General Brett J. DelPorto 
appeared on behalf of the State. Petitioner Paul C. Allen appeared pro se. Scott Daniels, 
who was appointed to represent petitioner, but later withdrew, sat at counsel table with 
petitioner to act in an advisory capacity. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took 
the matter under advisement and scheduled a telephone conference for February 9, 2007, 
to announce its decision. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. The State's motion to dismiss the petition for post-conviction relief is well-
taken and must be granted. 
VD19512917 
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2. The petitioner is not entitled to judgment on the pleadings and that motion 
must be denied. 
3. Almost all of petitioner's claims are procedurally barred. In his petition, 
petitioner alleged prosecutorial misconduct, juror misconduct, improper jury instruction, 
merger, structural error and ineffective assistance of counsel. All of these claims, with 
the exception of claims of ineffective assistance against petitioner's appellate attorneys, 
are barred because petitioner is not entitled to relief on any ground that was raised or 
addressed at trial or on appeal, or that could have been but was not raised at trial or on 
appeal. Utah Code Ann. § 73-35a-106(b) & (c) (West 2004). 
4. Petitioner also challenged the trial court's denial of the jurors' request that 
testimony of prosecution witnesses be provided to them during their deliberations. Upon 
receipt of the jurors' request, the court conferenced with counsel for the State and the 
defendant. All agreed that the testimony should not be provided. This accords with the 
rules of criminal procedure and was therefore appropriate. See Utah R. Crim. P. 17(m). 
Accordingly, petitioner's challenge to that ruling is without merit. 
5. Although not procedurally barred, petitioner's ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims against his appellate attorneys fail nonetheless. Under the Post-
Conviction Remedies Act, "[t]he petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-35a-105 (West 2004). To prevail, petitioner must demonstrate, first, that 
counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of 
-2-
reasonableness and, second, that petitioner was prejudiced by counsel's errors. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Petitioner is also required to plead his 
claims with sufficient specificity to allow the court to determine their validity. See State 
v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1162 (Utah App. 1998) ("'[Pjroof of ineffective assistance of 
counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality'") (citing 
Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993)). Petitioner's claims are too vague 
and speculative to meet his burden under either the first or second Stricklandprong. 
Accordingly, petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims fail and must be 
dismissed. 
6. The affidavit from one of the jurors in petitioner's criminal trial, which was 
submitted in support of petitioner's claims for relief, must be stricken. Because the juror 
affidavit purports to testify to matters concerning jury deliberations, it violates rule 
606(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which prohibits a juror's testimony, by affidavit or 
otherwise, concerning jury deliberations. 
7. The Court notes that both the State and petitioner have referenced a sealed 
transcript of a conference between petitioner and his trial counsel, Ron Yengich, which 
was held some time during or immediately after the petitioner's trial in February 2000. 
The conference was reportedly held to discuss possible claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel that could be raised by petitioner following his conviction. The Court has not 




Based on the motions, memoranda and other pleadings filed by both parties, and 
based on the arguments of counsel and petitioner, and because there is good cause for 
doing so, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. The State's motion to dismiss the petition for post-conviction relief is 
GRANTED. The petition's claims are DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and 
the Court DENIES post-conviction relief on all claims. 
2. The petitioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED. 
3. The State's motion to strike the juror affidavit is GRANTED. 
Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, "[a]ny party may appeal from the trial 
court's final judgment on a petition for post-conviction relief to the appellate court 
having jurisdiction." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 5a-110 (West 2004). 
DATED this [H day of fiebsjafy, 2007. 
BY THE COURT: 
^~^Jkj^5L 
Judge Glen R. Dawson /,/S'MS^& 
Second Judicial District C( 
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Addendum 5 
List of Petitioner's Claims on Post-Conviction Review and on Appeal: 
The following list sets out the page of the petition, with its record number in parenthesis, 
followed by the corresponding page of appellant's brief: 
(1) Judicial Bias — 15-19 (R43-47, 50-53, 73-78); 4-8, 11-14, 34-39. 
(2) Prosecution's use of false testimony during trial — 20-22, 25-30 (R48-50, 53-58); 9-
11,14-19. 
(3) Jurors were not fair and impartial — 30, 51-52 (R58, 79-80); 19, 40-41. 
(4) Trial court's refusal to give petitioner's proffered jury instructions — 31, 53 (R 59, 
81); 20, 42. 
(5) Erroneous jury instructions and special verdict form — 32-33, 36, 53 (R60-61, 64, 
81); 21-22, 25, 42. 
(6) Error in trying Petitioner for multiple offenses — 34-35, 37-41 (R62-63, 65-69); 23-
24, 26-30. 
(7) The Utah Supreme Court's decision on petitioner's direct appeal was result-driven and 
erroneous —41-45 (R69-73); 30-34. 
(8) Error by the trial court resulting in a trial that was fundamentally unfair— 50-55 
(R78-83); 39-44. 
(9) Error by the trial court in denying Petitioner's motion for a new trial — 50 (R78); 39. 
(10) Ineffective assistance of trial counsel — 54-55 (R82-83); 43-44. 
(11) Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel — 54-55 (R82-83); 43-44. 
Addendum 6 
Affidavit 
State of Utah ) 
County of Davis ) 
1. I, Trenton David was a juror in the Paul C. Allen murder trial in February 2000. 
2. We the jury sent a note to Judge Dawson, requesting trial testimony of state witness, 
George Taylor that was in conflict and facts needed to be confirmed which were in 
dispute between jurors in this capital offense case. 
3. This information was thought to be recorded of the trial and accessible to jurors in the 
fact finding and decision making process of jury deliberation. 
4. This information we (jurors) were seeking would have changed my verdict of guilt / 
innocence of the three week trial. 
5. The judge instructed us that we could not use notes of other jurors and that are notes 
were not evidence. 
6. Unfortunately, Judge Dawson denied allowing trial testimony to jurors during 
deliberation. 
7. As of being contacted by Gary Potter - Investigator, after trial's end regarding another 
issue (Jury Misconduct), the trial testimony refused by Judge was brought up with 
Gary Potter. 
8. At that time, Potter acknowledged that Taylor had stated the gun was purchased in or 
about April of 1996. 
9. This testimony would have proved Taylor was fabricating his testimony for self gain 
verses that of Toby White, who, testified selling gun to Taylor in " Late "93 or early 
"94". 
10. I told Potter that if Judge Dawson would have allowed George Taylor's testimony, it 
was very likely that I would have found Paul Allen innocent of all charges. 
11. I witnessed jurors disregarding instructions from the court not to expose one self to 
Media, and to not discuss case with other jury members during the trial. The jury was 
allowed to discuss the trial among jury members during the deliberation only. 
12. I felt other jurors had bias opinions before trial began, from exposure from the media. 
Dated This £& ^ Day of <L)ov\ 2005 
Trenton David 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this <?72&> Day of N\Vsi»£. TTZCXfT* 
:UJ.Jibl.j£SSi ? __ _ „._. 
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